Institutional Control and Corporate Governance by Rapp, Geoffrey Christopher
BYU Law Review
Volume 2015 | Issue 4 Article 6
October 2015
Institutional Control and Corporate Governance
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons, and the Organizations Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Institutional Control and Corporate Governance, 2015 BYU L. Rev. 985 (2016).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2015/iss4/6
RAPP.AA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016 5:00 PM 
 
 
Institutional Control and Corporate Governance 
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp* 
When they write obituaries on the National Collegiate Athletics 
Association (NCAA), the demise of which would have been 
unthinkable a decade ago1 but today seems increasingly plausible,2 
they may describe the beginning of the end of college sports3 as we 
know it as having originated, like so many college sports stories, in 
State College, Pennsylvania. Jerry Sandusky, once heir apparent to 
college football’s most heralded coach, is a soulless4 pedophile now 
safely behind bars.5 The conduct causing harm to his victims 
 
* Harold A. Anderson Professor of Law and Values and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, 
University of Toledo College of Law. The author thanks the participants in the 2014 
Marquette Sports Law Scholarship Workshop for their comments and feedback: Associate 
Dean Matt Parlow (Marquette), and Professors Paul Anderson (Marquette), Erin Buzuvis 
(Western New England), Adam Epstein (Central Michigan), Nathaniel Grow (Georgia), 
Dionne Koller (Baltimore), Meg Penrose (Texas A & M). In particular, Professor Nadelle 
Grossman (Marquette) provided helpful feedback and commentary while serving as a 
discussant for the author’s presentation. Professor Michael McCann (New Hampshire) also 
provided helpful comments in the early development of this piece. 
 1.  In 2001, the NCAA had a $325 million revenue budget. Julia L. Higgs & John T. 
Reisch, Testing NCAA Compliance at Southeastern State University: A Case Study, 17 ISSUES 
IN ACCT. EDUC. 95, 95 (2002). 
 2.  In a recent presentation, I described the “Four Horsemen of the NCAA’s 
Apocalypse” as the Sandusky affair, unionization at Northwestern, antitrust and 
Name/Image/Likeness litigation, and the potential workers’ compensation and/or tort 
exposure connected with traumatic brain injuries and concussions. For a discussion of some 
of these fundamental challenges to the NCAA, see Nicolas A. Novy, “The Emperor Has No 
Clothes”: The NCAA’s Last Chance as the Middle Man in College Athletics, 21 SPORTS L.J. 
227 (2014). 
 3.  As one author argued, “in the long run, the NCAA’s model will eventually 
collapse.” Scott Lemieux, The NCAA’s Business Model is About to Collapse—And That’s a Good 
Thing, GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2014, 6:45 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/aug/11/ncaa-business-model-court-ruling-obannon-case. 
 4.  Maureen Dowd commented that Joe Paterno sold his soul, but Jerry Sandusky was 
a man without a soul to sell. JoePa Sold His Soul. As for Jerry Sandusky, He Didn’t Have One to 
Sell, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (July 23, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/ 
opinion/Op-Ed/2012/07/23/Maureen-Dowd-JoePa-sold-his-soul-As-for-Jerry-Sandusky-
he-didn-t-have-one-to-sell/stories/201207230127. 
 5.  Jenna Johnson, Jerry Sandusky Sentenced to 30 to 60 Years in Prison, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/jerry-sandusky-sentenced-
to-30-to-60-years-in-prison/2012/10/09/6d5ed134-1184-11e2-ba83-
a7a396e6b2a7_story.html. 
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amounts to his greatest sin. But Sandusky may also be remembered 
as the first straw in a pile that broke the NCAA’s back. 
The Sandusky affair was shocking and, to the NCAA’s leaders, 
especially disgusting.6 It was something they wanted to move past—
and quickly.7 But it was also, in a sense, a “rope-a-dope.”8 It lured 
the NCAA’s top leaders into mounting a moral high horse, 
condemning Sandusky and his protectors, and acting without the 
usual process9 to administer a punishment that seemed quick and 
decisive and that, the leaders no doubt hoped, would relegate the 
incident to the pages of history books. 
But once the NCAA jumped onto the moralism podium, it 
found itself in a curious position.10 If the NCAA could impose 
draconian sanctions on Penn State—even though there was 
considerable question even among NCAA staff11 as to whether the 
institution violated NCAA rules—because of moral outrage 
associated with Sandusky’s crimes, how could the NCAA also deny 
the fundamental immorality of its seeming exploitation of “amateur 
athletes”?12 Forced to defend itself against antitrust litigation13 and 
 
 6.  Michael Rosenberg, NCAA Sanctions Against Penn State Reinforce Overemphasis 
on Winning, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 23, 2012), http://www.si.com/more-
sports/2012/07/23/penn-state-ncaa-sanctions-mark-emmert (“Mark Emmert had 
enough. He could no longer stomach the disgusting, sickening idea of Penn State winning 
football games.”). 
 7.  Geoffrey Rapp, Opposing View: Penn State Deserved the ‘Death Penalty’, USA 
TODAY (July 23, 2012, 8:24 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/story/ 
2012-07-23/NCAA-Penn-death-penalty/56444576/1 (“The NCAA’s decision to act 
without a full investigation . . . means we might never learn the full extent of this story, which 
will hamper the healing process.”). 
 8.  Douglas E. Abrams, Sports in the Courts: The Role of Sports References in Judicial 
Opinions, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 38 n.201 (2010). 
 9.  Rapp, supra note 7. Matt Mitten describes the NCAA’s Executive Committee’s 
actions as having “usurped the NCAA’s customary disciplinary process.” Matthew J. Mitten, 
The Penn State “Consent Decree”: The NCAA’s Coercive Means Don’t Justify Its Laudable Ends, 
but is There a Legal Remedy?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 333 (2014). 
 10.  As one author put it, “the whole process reeked of a desire by the NCAA to put 
itself on the right side of a moral issue to move the conversation, if only temporarily, away 
from its own moral failings.” Stephen A. Miller, The NCAA Needs to Let Someone Else Enforce 
Its Rules, ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/ 
2012/10/the-ncaa-needs-to-let-someone-else-enforce-its-rules/264012. 
 11.  Joe Nocera, Opinion, The N.C.A.A.’s Big Bluff, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/joe-nocera-the-ncaas-bluff.html?_r=0. 
 12.  Nabeel Gadit, Note, An End to the NCAA’s Exploitation of Former Student-Athletes: 
How O’Bannon v. NCAA Highlights the Need for an Inalienable Reversionary Interest in the 
Right of Publicity for Former Student-Athletes, 30 CARDOZO ART & ENT. L.J. 347, 351 (2012). 
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watching a growing push toward unionization by student athletes,14 
the NCAA had now accepted that moral arguments15 were legitimate 
in what otherwise could have been defined as the “business” of 
college sports. Unfortunately for the NCAA, its moral position 
regarding athlete unionization and student-athlete pay was even 
more conspicuously defective than its legal one.16 The use of morality 
to drive punishment in spite of a lack of clarity regarding authority in 
the Penn State matter also invited a skeptical view of the NCAA’s 
inaction in subsequent cases involving alleged sexual crimes by star 
athletes at big-time schools. If Penn State broke the rules and 
deserved punishment for not stopping Sandusky, could Florida State 
University be held responsible for its lackadaisical and dilatory 
response regarding the rape accusations against Jameis Winston?17 
The Penn State scandal came to a curious end in January, 
2015, when the NCAA agreed to restore previously vacated wins 
to the university in order to resolve a lawsuit that originated 
with the question of where the funds associated with a $60 
million financial penalty should be spent.18 Although the NCAA 
asserted that the January 2015 developments confirmed its 
authority to act against Penn State, others viewed them as an act 
of “surrender” by the Association.19 
In this paper, I step back to examine an as-yet unexplored 
aspect of the Sandusky affair. The NCAA’s quick and precipitous 
 
 13.  O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. C 09-1967 CW, C 09-3329 CW, 
C 09-4882 CW, 2010 WL 445190, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
 14.  See generally William B. Gould IV et al., Full Court Press: Northwestern University, 
a New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 15.  For a discussion of the moral arguments surrounding amateurism in athletics, see J. 
Patrick Dobel, A Beleaguered Ideal: Defending NCAA Amateurism, Mar. 23, 2012, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028182. 
 16.  Kemper C. Powell, A Façade of Amateurism: An Examination of the NCAA Grant-
in-Aid System Under the Sherman Act, 20 SPORTS L.J. 241, 243 (2013). 
 17.  See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Doe v. Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 
No. 6:15-cv-00016-GAP-KRS (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.al.com/sports/ 
index.ssf/2015/01/jameis_winstons_accuser_files.html (alleging that “FSU did nothing to 
investigate Plaintiff ’s report of rape while the FSU Athletics Department continued to keep 
the incident a secret”). 
 18.  NCAA Restores Penn State’s Wins Under Paterno, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 19, 
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2015/01/19/ncaa-restores-penn-
states-wins-under-paterno. 
 19.  Id. 
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sanction of Penn State20—without the usual time-consuming21 
(and perhaps feared-to-be-embarrassing) investigation—was 
grounded in the so-called Freeh Report, commissioned by the 
Penn State Board of Trustees.22 Based on the Freeh Report, the 
NCAA concluded that Penn State’s reaction, or failure to react, to 
Sandusky’s crimes amounted to a lack of institutional control,23 as 
required by the NCAA’s rules (“Articles 2.1 [and] 6.01.1 . . . of 
the NCAA Constitution”).24 
For its part, the Freeh Report found that the Penn State Board 
of Trustees failed in its responsibilities to exert proper oversight.25 To 
demonstrate this, the report quoted several Delaware decisions on 
the fiduciary obligations of for-profit company boards to engage in 
oversight as part of their duties to corporate shareholders.26 What is 
striking about this reliance on Delaware fiduciary duty decisions is 
that an NCAA member institution’s obligations to exert institutional 
control are contractual in nature.27 The NCAA is a voluntary 
association.28 In consideration for participation and the benefits it is 
believed to offer to schools, colleges agree to abide by the NCAA’s 
 
 20.  Professor Mitten describes the sanctions imposed on Penn State as 
“unprecedented.” Mitten, supra note 9, at 321. 
 21.  Timothy Davis & Christopher T. Hairston, Majoring in Infractions: The Evolution 
of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Enforcement Structure, 92 OR. L. REV. 979, 
986 (2014). 
 22.  FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE 
COUNSEL REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO 
THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY (2012) [hereinafter FREEH 
REPORT], http://health-equity.pitt.edu/3956/1/REPORT_FINAL_071212.pdf. 
 23.  See BINDING CONSENT DECREE IMPOSED BY THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND ACCEPTED BY THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 2 (2012) 
[hereinafter CONSENT DECREE], http://www.ncaa.com/content/penn-state-conclusions. The 
NCAA actually went further, concluding that Penn State’s conduct was “an unprecedented 
failure of institutional integrity” that “far exceed[ed] a lack of institutional control.” Id. at 1, 4. 
 24.  Id at 2. See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 25.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 15. 
 26.  Id. at 100. 
 27.  Miller v. NCAA, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1486 (D. Nev. 1992) (“[T]he record 
establishes that the NCAA and the . . . member institutions have a contractual 
relationship . . . .”); Josephine R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Interpretation, 
Enforcement, and Infractions Processes: The Laws that Regulate them and the Nature of Court 
Review, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 257, 267 (2010). 
 28.  NCAA v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Ky. 2001). 
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rules, including those requiring “control” over athletics.29 In essence, 
when imposing a sanction, the NCAA finds that an institution failed 
to adhere to its side of the bargain. Yet the Freeh Report turned to 
Delaware cases dealing with fiduciary obligations—which arise in the 
absence of formal contract—in order to understand the meaning of 
an institution’s contractual obligations as an NCAA member. 
Fiduciary law serves to fill gaps left when formal contracts either do 
not exist or where, due to transaction costs, contracts are incomplete 
because it would have been inefficient for the parties to develop 
them more fully.30 Here, a contract existed. As such, the Freeh 
Report’s recourse to gap-filling rules to understand the meaning of 
an institution’s contractual commitments is odd.31 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the parallels and divergence between the 
Freeh Report on the Penn State child sex abuse scandal and a body 
of case law emerging out of Delaware since the mid-1990s. Its 
important contribution is to highlight the differences produced by 
governance regimes created by private associations (in the Sandusky 
case, by the NCAA) and those produced for corporations through 
the development of Delaware’s common law of corporate fiduciary 
duties. As the story I tell will reveal, Delaware’s approach involves 
vigorously contested litigation producing nuanced doctrine easily 
applied in practice. The NCAA’s private associational governance 
does not involve the same level of adversarialism, resulting in a less 
workable body of decisions. 
 
 29.  Miller v. NCAA, 10 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1993) (“As a condition of 
membership, each institution is obligated to apply and enforce all NCAA legislation related to 
its own athletic programs.”). 
 30.  Mariana Pargendler, Modes of Gap Filling: Good Faith and Fiduciary Duties 
Reconsidered, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2008). While the NCAA’s legislative apparatus is 
hardly efficient, according to the conventional sense of the word, it does not on its face present 
an instance of bargain-impeding transaction costs. Rule changes can be implemented largely 
without creating obligations for member institutions to breach existing contracts. It may be 
that a true and frank consensus on appropriate institutional oversight would be difficult to spell 
out due to failed internal political processes at member institutions, but that does not 
constitute something that would ordinarily be considered a bargain-impeding transaction cost. 
 31.  Fiduciary duties “are untailored defaults that strike the hypothetical bargain to 
decide what most parties would have wanted.” Id. at 1353. But where parties have struck 
a contract, as is the case in the relationship between schools and the NCAA, one would 
expect the transaction costs associated with greater specification of member obligations to 
be surmountable. 
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The basics of the Sandusky affair are probably known to all.32 A 
football coach for decades at Penn State University, and at one time 
the heir apparent33 to Joe Paterno, Sandusky committed heinous acts 
of child sex abuse starting in at least 1998 (and likely long before). 
Many of these acts were committed on Penn State’s campus in 
university facilities. Even though some of the university employees 
witnessing the abuse came forward, the university took no action to 
stop Sandusky’s crimes for almost two decades. 
The Penn State Board of Trustees retained the law firm34 of 
former FBI Director Louis Freeh to investigate the failure of 
university employees to take appropriate action in the Sandusky 
matter and to recommend changes to university policies and 
governance structures based on the Sandusky affair. The firm’s 
report was published on July 12, 2012.35 
In a sudden turn that surprised many observers,36 the NCAA 
used the Freeh Report, rather than an independent compliance 
investigation, to strong-arm37 the university into accepting a major 
punishment—tens of millions in fines, bowl bans, the vacating of 
wins and records, and scholarship reductions.38 
The NCAA found sufficient evidence in the Freeh Report to 
conclude that the university lacked adequate institutional control 
over its athletic programs.39 The Principle of Institutional Control 
and Responsibility—Article 2.1 of the NCAA Constitution—requires 
 
 32.  For a recap, see Zachary D. Crowe, The NCAA “Death Penalty”—Death for Penn 
State or Death for Competition?, 14 U. DEN. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 79 (2013). 
 33.  Jerry Sandusky’s Son Details Abuse, ESPN (July 18, 2014), http://espn.go.com/ 
college-football/story/_/id/11230179/son-former-penn-state-assistant-jerry-sandusky-
alleges-more-severe-abuse-originally-stated. 
 34.  The firm is known as Freeh Sporkin and Sullivan, LLP. Among other notable 
partners in the firm is Judge Thomas Sporkin, a former chief of the SEC’s enforcement 
division. See Our People, http://www.freehsporkinsullivan.com/leaders?leader=10#leader. 
 35.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 1. 
 36.  Andy Staples, Justice in Penn State Case Should Come from Courts, Not NCAA, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 2, 2012), http://www.si.com/more-sports/2012/07/02/penn-
state-jerry-sandusky-ncaa. Professor Mitten argues that Penn State’s “egregious” conduct 
“arguably does not violate any then-existing NCAA rules, whose primary objectives are to 
maintain and promote academic integrity, amateurism, and competitive balance as well as the 
health, safety, and welfare of student-athletes.” Mitten, supra note 9, at 334. 
 37.  Christian Dennie, Post-Penn State: Protecting Against Sexual Harassment and 
Misconduct in Athletics, 75 TEX. B.J. 828, 828 (2012). 
 38.  Crowe, supra note 32, at 80–81. 
 39.  CONSENT DECREE, supra note 23, at 2. 
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a university to “control its intercollegiate athletics program in 
compliance with”40 NCAA rules and regulations. Institutional 
control violations have been at the core of most recent major NCAA 
actions against universities. 
While the Freeh Report was used to support a finding of lack of 
institutional control, its authors, interestingly, were not trained in 
NCAA compliance,41 nor did they make the violation of NCAA rules 
part of their investigation.42 Likely more experienced in corporate 
internal investigations than NCAA compliance, the Freeh Report 
drafters, perhaps unsurprisingly, turned for inspiration to Delaware 
fiduciary duty law in outlining the responsibility of Penn State’s 
board and leadership with regard to criminal activity by university 
employees and affiliated persons.43 
Since the mid-1990s, Delaware law has seen a noticeable shift 
in the treatment of corporate boards accused of failure to monitor 
or to engage in proper oversight.44 In the 1963 Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers decision, the Delaware Supreme Court declined to 
impose an obligation on board members to engage in “corporate 
espionage.”45 That decision was effectively overruled in 199646 by 
 
 40.  NCAA, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 3 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL], http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf. 
 41.  However, there was some interaction between Freeh’s team and NCAA staff during 
the course of the former’s investigation into Penn State. See Don Van Natta Jr., Docs: NCAA, 
Freeh Worked Together, ESPN (Nov. 12, 2014), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/ 
11863293/court-documents-indicate-ncaa-freeh-investigators-worked-together-penn-state-
nittany-lions-investigation. 
 42.  Notably, the Freeh Report does not mention the words “institutional control.” 
 43.  While it is not surprising that the Freeh Report’s attorney authors used cases 
recollected from their corporate law classes to define the scope of a board’s responsibility, it 
was perhaps a mistake for the NCAA to transplant the report’s finding of a lack of corporate-
fiduciary-level oversight to the contract definition of institutional control. When parties to 
contracts agree on what their duties to one another are (as where the NCAA’s members have 
agreed to exert “control”), they rarely agree to “wide open, ‘litigation-breeder’ duties.” Scott 
FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships are not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 321 (1999). 
Instead, they aim to draft “rules rather than principles.” Id. 
 44.  Andrew D. Appleby & Matthew D. Montaigne, Three’s Company: Stone v. Ritter 
and the Improper Characterization of Good Faith in the Fiduciary Duty “Triad”, 62 ARK. L. 
REV. 431, 431 (2009) (describing debate regarding doctrinal issues). 
 45.  188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1963). 
 46.  Caremark represented “a departure from precedent” in its suggestion “that a 
director could face personal liability for . . . failure to take steps to assure the corporation’s 
compliance with the law.” H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight 
Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 16 (2001). 
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Chancellor Allen in In re Caremark Derivative Litigation.47 
Although the chancellor found that the directors of Caremark did 
in fact have in place adequate information and reporting systems, 
he took the opportunity to sketch the proper structure of a 
fiduciary duty claim based on the failure to engage in oversight.48 
The Delaware Supreme Court accepted the Caremark theory a few 
years later in Stone v. Ritter.49  
In its description of the failures of the Penn State board, the 
Freeh Report uses language that echoes the vision of board 
responsibility in Caremark and Stone. In fact, the report quotes both 
cases to show how the Penn State board failed in its duties to 
demand information about major risks to the university from the 
school’s president.50 The influence of Caremark on the Freeh Report 
is prominent. 
A critical difference between the NCAA’s treatment of 
“institutional control” and the Delaware courts’ treatment of 
“corporate oversight” has to do with the manner in which they 
articulate obligations of the governed. NCAA compliance decisions 
relating to institutional control take one of two forms: the NCAA 
may find a lack of institutional control and impose punishment, or 
it may find that other NCAA rules were violated but that no 
institutional control violation occurred51 (perhaps concluding that 
the institution violated only the lesser standard imposing an 
obligation to “monitor”)52. In the cases where no institutional 
control failure occurred, the NCAA will not impose its more 
draconian sanctions53 even though some rules were violated (and 
typically self-reported). There are essentially no instances in which 
the NCAA will issue an opinion where no rules were violated.54 As a 
 
 47.  In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969–70 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  911 A.2d 362, 365 (Del. 2006). 
 50.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 15, 100. 
 51.  See, e.g., NCAA Committee on Infractions, Drake University Infractions Report, Oct. 24, 1990, 
https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch?miSearchSubmit=publicReport&key=91&publicTerms=(%2
0institutional%20AND%20control). 
 52.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 40, at 312. 
 53.  Typically, an institution would already have imposed some self-sanctions by this 
point, and the NCAA might accept as sufficient the institution’s own self-sanction. 
 54.  The NCAA’s database of infractions decisions often contains nothing more than a 
summary entry for cases in which no major violations were found—with reference to the 
legislation at issue but no narrative description of why the committee found no violations. 
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result, the NCAA’s published opinions focus on negatives—steps to 
avoiding violations. They do not focus on best practices in terms of 
institutional control.55 Focusing on negatives may make sense 
where a set of rules provides a specific set of violations. For a more 
amorphous concept like institutional control, however, best 
practices might be more useful in crafting and designing 
compliance programs. 
Compared to the NCAA’s approach, Delaware case law (often in 
dicta56 in cases finding no fiduciary breach for oversight failures) 
 
 55.  Professor Jo Potuto describes as an “unusual aspect” of the NCAA’s practices that 
the Committee on Infractions, which resolves grievances, does not have the power to “render 
authoritative interpretations”; instead, that function rests with the NCAA’s Board of Directors 
and Legislative Council. Potuto, supra note 27, at 274. Acknowledging that this is a “topsy-
turvy” approach, she argues that it is nonetheless “integral to NCAA governance.” Id. She 
argues that this is so because most decisions in an athletic department are made not by a 
university employee reading and interpreting published infractions decisions, but instead by 
consulting with various NCAA committee staffers. Major violations are “by no means the 
bread and butter of the compliance job.” Id. While I find this argument for the practical 
benefits of devolved, non-adjudicative guidance persuasive regarding run-of-the mill rules 
compliance, when we turn to the question of what constitutes that most serious violation (lack 
of institutional control) the NCAA’s structure does not facilitate clarity, since no university 
compliance officer is ever likely to call the NCAA and offer a description of years of violations 
and leadership failings and ask, “Is this an institutional control issue?” In other words, the 
NCAA’s staff-driven interpretation process provides clarity on technical rule violations but a 
level of opacity not found in the Delaware decisions on corporate governance when it comes to 
the larger issue of institutional control. 
Another advantage of adversarial decision-making is clarity. Each side presents an argument 
and the decision-maker crafts a solution to the disagreement. Administrative “interpretation” 
tends to be mired in bureaucrat-speak and, divorced from the facts of specific cases, lacks a tie 
to real-world scenarios. This reduces the value of administrative interpretations from a 
planning perspective. Moreover, the question of whether or not NCAA Infractions decisions 
have precedential value is one on which the NCAA itself is not entirely clear. The Committee 
on Infractions “cannot be strictly bound to decisions made years earlier.” NCAA Committee 
on Infractions, Supplemental Report of Infractions Report No. 355—Boise State University, Oct. 
12, 2012, at 5, https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch?miSearchSubmit=appeal& 
seqnumber=126&publicTerms=THIS%20PHRASE%20WILL%20NOT%20BE%20REPEATE
D. The COI views its role as follows: “past cases do provide some guidance, but each case 
stands on its own.” NCAA Committee on Infractions, University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff 
Public Infractions Report, November 5, 2014, at 12–13, https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/ 
exec/miSearch?miSearchSubmit=publicReport&key=850&publicTerms=THIS%20PHRASE%
20WILL%20NOT%20BE%20REPEATED. Other times, the NCAA COI justifies its approach 
by reference to specific past practices: “In adhering to case precedent . . . .” NCAA Committee 
on Infractions, University of Alaska, Anchorage Public Infractions Report, May 2, 2014, at 6, 
https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch?miSearchSubmit=publicReport&key=840&pu
blicTerms=THIS%20PHRASE%20WILL%20NOT%20BE%20REPEATED. 
 56.  The fact that Delaware courts may offer a new clarification in dicta does not 
“seem to affect its importance as an addition to Delaware law.” Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar 
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does something different. Delaware’s judges have gone to great 
length to give readers a sense of what kinds of things one must do to 
avoid liability under the doctrines those judges have articulated. The 
resulting body of jurisprudence has provided direction and incentive 
for a rapid modernization of corporate reporting and compliance 
regimes.57 Although the NCAA has issued various kinds of policy 
guidance relating to institutional control, its process of writing 
lengthy opinions only where violations are found leaves many 
questions unanswered. Perhaps most notably, the NCAA requires 
institutional control but does not provide much guidance for the 
proper reporting chains within universities.58 For instance, Penn 
State is faulted in the Freeh Report for having its athletics 
compliance officer report via channels other than to an overall 
university compliance officer.59 Is a centralized compliance regime 
now required to exercise proper institutional control? We have no 
clear guidance, even though providing such guidance would be 
relatively simple for the NCAA to do. By comparison, Delaware’s 
post-Caremark jurisprudence has generated specific, tangible insights 
that corporations have put into place as part of their internal 
compliance regimes. For instance, Caremark has led corporations to 
adopt new processes for reporting violations (and sending them up 
the chain of command).60 Disney led boards to adopt new practices 
utilized in negotiating executive compensation packages. 
The relative lack of clarity in regard to the NCAA institutional 
control rule61 arises in part because of the lack of scrutiny and in 
part because of a lack of a truly contested, adversarial enforcement 
process. Associational governance rules (and decisions) are 
 
Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1061, 1080 (2000). 
 57.  See infra Section V.B. 
 58.  As a result, universities have “many different paths” for how athletics departments 
report to higher university officials, and, in practice, interaction may “depend[] very much 
upon personalities.” JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT’S PERSPECTIVE 102–03 (2003). The lack 
of clarity in regard to best practices thus leaves governance of athletics to develop in an ad hoc, 
unpredictable way. 
 59.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 139. 
 60.  Dawn-Marie Driscoll et al., Business Ethics and Compliance: What Management is 
Doing and Why, 99 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 35, 37 (1998), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/ 
10.1111/0045-3609.00006/epdf. 
 61.  The institutional control rule is the most “frequently misunderstood” of the 
NCAA’s rules. DUDERSTADT, supra note 58, at 231. 
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protected from scrutiny under the so-called law of voluntary 
associations—in essence, a principle of judicial abstention.62 In the 
NCAA’s case, further protection is provided by the apparent non-
state-actor status of the Association,63 which means courts do not 
scrutinize the NCAA from a “due process” perspective. Immune 
from scrutiny, the NCAA’s processes also lack vigorously contested 
disputes: when institutions are accused of infractions, they tend to 
roll over and accept punishment (in the hope of avoiding a more 
draconian sanction).64 
While board decisions on corporate governance are protected 
from judicial review, to a degree, by the business judgment rule65 or 
state laws permitting the adoption of exculpatory provisions,66 the 
fact is that shareholder fiduciary claims are vigorously litigated—on 
both sides. The result is a much clearer and cleaner vision about 
corporate governance than the one the NCAA has articulated about 
university institutional control over athletics. Moreover, the regular 
litigation of corporate governance disputes—and the rapid pace of 
Delaware resolution of those disputes—means that corporate 
governance rules can evolve and adapt over time.67 Caremark itself 
was triggered by changing organizational sentencing guidelines from 
the federal government.68 Today, the implications of Caremark may 
be affected69 by statutes like Sarbanes-Oxley70 and Dodd-Frank.71 
Delaware’s process for making a common law of fiduciary oversight 
is equipped to incorporate those developments in a way that the 
 
 62.  See infra notes 347–48 and accompanying text. 
 63.  See infra notes 336–41 and accompanying text. 
 64.  See infra notes 313–17 and accompanying text. 
 65.  See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004). 
 66.  See, e.g., DEL. G. CORP. L. § 102(b)(7). 
 67.  See Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 
493 (2012). 
 68.  In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968–69 (Del. 
Ch. 1996). 
 69.  See Alec Orenstein, A Modified Caremark Standard to Protect Shareholders of 
Financial Firms from Poor Risk Management, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 766 (2011). 
 70.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006)). 
 71.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A.) (West 2010). 
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NCAA’s shielded, from-on-high method of outlining institutional 
control is not.72 
The picture these disparities paint is of a very different outcome 
for a governance regime created by private associational rulemaking73 
versus governance rules that result from the evolution of the 
common law in fiduciary duty claims asserted in shareholder 
derivative lawsuits. The implications of this exploration are quite 
significant. Calls for the deregulation of corporations—such as calls 
to roll back Sarbanes-Oxley74 or to reduce the reach of Dodd-
Frank75—are based on a notion that corporations should be 
permitted to voluntarily decide what kinds of compliance regimes to 
embrace. But that would miss out on something important: the 
clarity and nuance generated by the current process of litigating 
shareholder derivative claims. 
Obviously, some of the discussion in this article may prove 
outdated should the potential cracks in the NCAA that emerged in 
the summer of 2014—with “major” conferences breaking away from 
the legislative and compliance authority of the larger 
organization76— prove fatal. Even if the NCAA fades into separate 
components, those components are likely to have their own sets of 
rules. Because the compliance professional’s voice is an increasingly 
powerful one within higher education-affiliated athletics, new mini-
NCAA rules are most likely to be written by compliance officers and 
can be predicted to include some of the core features of existing 
NCAA regulations.77 
 
 72.  See supra notes 40–44. 
 73.  There may be some settings in which private associational rulemaking offers 
advantages. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy or 
Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 420 (1997). 
 74.  Cyrus Afshar & Paul Rose, Capital Markets Competitiveness: A Survey of Recent 
Reports, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 439, 452 (2007) (discussing calls to repeal 
Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 75.  Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to 
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1319–20 (2013) (discussing industry efforts to repeal 
Dodd-Frank). 
 76.  Brian Bennett, NCAA Board Votes to Allow Autonomy, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-
autonomy-five-power-conferences. 
 77.  For a discussion of the role of the NCAA compliance officer, see MARC EDELMAN 
& GEOFFREY CHRISTOPHER RAPP, CAREERS IN SPORTS LAW 73–84 (2014). 
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II. INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL BEFORE PENN STATE 
Before the Sandusky affair, the NCAA had provided rules 
requiring its member institutions to exert control over their athletics 
programs, sought to clarify the requirement by issuing interpretive 
releases, and reported on its investigations into specific cases of rule 
violation. The result was, and still is, a governance regime that does 
not do enough to equip schools to comply. 
A. NCAA Rules and Sanctions 
The NCAA’s rules78 are not law, though they are perhaps most 
often written and read by lawyers. They are the rules of a private 
association, subject to judicial deference under the abstention 
principle sometimes referred to as “the law of voluntary associations” 
and free from constitutional review due to the Supreme Court’s 
thirty-year-old decision in NCAA v. Tarkanian.79 Some NCAA rules 
are technical and specific—for instance, the “initial-eligibility index” 
provided by Rule 14.3.1.1.2 which sets forth the minimum 
necessary standardized test scores for varying levels of high school 
GPA in order to be eligible to participate in college sports.80 
Other rules, however, are written in more open-ended, 
“muddier” terms.81 Such is the case with the “Principle of 
Institutional Control and Responsibility” (as it is referred to in 
Article 2) or “Principle of Institutional Control” (as it is referred to 
in Article 6). Article 2.1 provides: 
2.1.1 Responsibility for Control. It is the responsibility of each 
member institution to control its intercollegiate athletics program 
in compliance with the rules and regulations of the Association. 
 
 78.  Though I refer, for the sake of shorthand, to “NCAA rules,” in fact there are 
several different rulebooks for varying levels of competition and other associated legislative 
documents and interpretations that are relevant. 
 79.  488 U.S. 179 (1988). Whether Tarkanian was good law at the time, or remains 
good law in light of Brentwood Academy, is open to debate. See infra notes 336–41 and 
accompanying text. 
 80.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 40, at 156. 
 81.  The use of muddy terms in setting standards for conduct is also the subject of 
extensive scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). 
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The institution’s president or chancellor is responsible for the 
administration of all aspects of the athletics program .82 
2.1.2 Scope of Responsibility. The institution’s responsibility for the 
conduct of its intercollegiate athletics program includes 
responsibility for the actions of its staff members and for the 
actions of any other individual or organization engaged in activities 
promoting the athletics interests of the institution.83 
Article 6 provides: 
6.01.1 Institutional Control. The control and responsibility for the 
conduct of intercollegiate athletics shall be exercised by the 
institution itself and by the conference(s), if any, of which it is a 
member. Administrative control or faculty control, or a 
combination of the two, shall constitute institutional control.84 
The remaining portions of Article 6 lay out the responsibilities 
of particular athletics department components and higher 
education entities.85 
The penalties for violating the institutional control rule can be 
severe.86 A violation of this rule is perceived to be the “most 
damning” NCAA rule violation because “it represents a failure 
within the institution, rather than an act—although major and 
important—that may have been committed by a distant booster, 
renegade coach, or some other variety of ‘independent contractor’ 
who has little or no connection to the program.”87 A lack of 
institutional control “sometimes suggests a climate of 
noncompliance or a lackadaisical approach to NCAA rules 
compliance—akin to a climate within a corporation where there was 
contempt for rules, negligent disregard of rules, or ignorance of 
rules due to a failure in rules education.”88 
The institutional control rule is the subject of many “truisms and 
other ‘isms’,” including the notion that it is a “shared” or “campus-
 
 82.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 40, at 3. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 41. 
 85.  Id. at 41–42. 
 86.  Higgs & Reisch, supra note 1, at 96. 
 87.  Gene Marsh & Marie Robbins, Weighing the Interests of the Institution, the 
Membership and Institutional Representatives in an NCAA Investigation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 667, 
671 (2003). 
 88.  Id. 
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wide” responsibility.89 While some suggest that the rules themselves 
are both “brief and easy to understand,”90 in real world cases that 
level of clarity is hard to discern. Athletics compliance “does not lend 
itself to easy, clear, direct, and irrefutable answers.”91 
In part, the lack of clarity in NCAA rules may arise from “fierce 
internal battles”92 within the Association and at individual colleges 
and universities; in response, the NCAA avoids systemic questions 
and instead has “implemented wave after wave of rules and 
regulations governing the conduct of sports, resulting in a complex, 
hard to understand, unusable code of conduct.”93 
B. Infractions Releases 
The NCAA released a short guide in 1998 (updated since) titled 
Principles of Institutional Control,94 which appears to be an attempt 
to describe the substance of its institutional control rule. 
The NCAA’s description of the critical elements of institutional 
control is poorly worded, besotted with the passive voice, and 
therefore confusing and difficult to understand. Although the first 
section title in the document provides that institutional control is to 
be defined in “common-sense terms,”95 the manner in which the 
NCAA then defines it is hardly consonant with common sense. 
To decide if there is a “lack” of institutional control, “it is 
necessary to ascertain what formal institutional policies and 
procedures were in place” and “whether those policies and 
procedures, if adequate, were being monitored and enforced.”96 The 
examination would look to the policies in place to see if the school 
failed. However, to generate a more easily applicable list of best 
 
 89.  Id. at 672–73. 
 90.  Id. at 704. Professor Potuto writes that “Institutional control requires 
institutions to self-police and then to self-report if violations are uncovered.” Potuto, supra 
note 27, at 283. 
 91.  David A. Pierce et al., Creating Synergy Between Athletics Compliance and Academic 
Programs: Students in the Compliance Office, 5 J. CONTEMP. ATHLETICS 183, 184 (2011). 
 92.  DUDERSTADT, supra note 58, at 7. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  NCAA Committee on Infractions, Principles of Institutional Control (2012–2013), 
http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/ill/genrel/auto_pdf/2012-13/misc_non_event/ 
institutional-control.pdf. 
 95.  Id. at 1. 
 96.  Id. 
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practices, the document could instead have described what it would 
mean to have proper institutional control. The institutional control 
rule imposes positive obligations, but the NCAA has missed an 
opportunity to describe what a school needs to do. The document 
defines the probative inquiry in the negative, rather than positive, 
sense—not telling us what schools ought to do to exercise 
institutional control but instead how to decide if they have failed. In 
essence, a lack of control could be shown, under the document’s 
articulation, by one of four deficiencies: (1) a lack of policies and 
procedures; (2) inadequacy of policies and procedures; (3) failure to 
monitor policies and procedures (or, as it probably should have said, 
failure to monitor conduct potentially violating policies and 
procedures);97 or (4) failure to enforce policies and procedures. 
The document then provides an unusually short paragraph on 
“violations” that would not constitute a lack of institutional control 
and then continues into a much longer and, again, negatively 
phrased list of “no-nos.”98 It takes some effort to reason from what 
one is being told not to do to what one should do, and the initial 
portions of the document are not drafted in a positive, best practices 
sense.99 Instead, the document is drafted as a list of worst practices. 
For instance, the NCAA notes that a lack of institutional 
control would be suggested by the assignment of compliance duties 
to a person “who lacks sufficient authority to have the confidence 
or respect of others.”100 To exhibit institutional control, then, 
schools would want to make sure that compliance duties reside in 
the hands of a person who does have that authority. But who is that? 
Must that person report outside of the athletics’ chain of 
command? Must the person have a direct reporting line to the 
university president or to the board of directors? Exactly what 
authority is “sufficient,” and why, precisely, does the “confidence” 
of others matter? Would not the ability to take action to deter or 
arrest rule violations be sufficient even if “others” lacked 
confidence? And, who are those others? 
 
 97.  The NCAA is not sanctioning schools for failing to update the policies themselves. 
 98.  Principles of Institutional Control, supra note 94, at 1–2. 
 99.  NCAA rules “do not suggest or mandate specific monitoring controls.” Brian D. 
Shannon, Athletic Compliance at Texas Tech, TECHSAN, Jan. 1, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2168934. 
 100.  Principles of Institutional Control, supra note 94, at 1–2. 
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The document concludes with a section featuring a cumbersome 
heading, “COMPLIANCE MEASURES IN PLACE AT THE 
TIME OF VIOLATION AS A FACTOR IN DETERMINING 
WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN A LACK OF 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL.”101 Apparently “BEST 
PRACTICES” isn’t a clearer, cleaner approach. Ever coy, the NCAA 
states, “Institutions are eager to learn what measures can be taken to 
reduce the likelihood that in the event a violation does occur, it will 
result in a finding of a lack of institutional control.”102 Of course they 
are! This would seem to be a wonderful opportunity to tell them 
what those measures are. Not so—instead, the document lists “some 
of the steps” that can be taken, but it also says institutions should 
not assume that taking these enumerated steps would be enough: 
“the presence of such measures are [sic] not a guarantee against” a 
finding of a lack of institutional control.103 What would be more 
helpful here is an actual listing of the elements of a “best practices” 
oversight program, with examples of those elements being 
successfully applied. 
The actual list of steps is then somewhat bizarre. First, the 
document says the “NCAA rules” must be readily available. Since 
there is no actual document or set of documents called “rules,” the 
statement is a bit opaque. Even if we presume athletes and coaches 
can make the inference about what the guide is referring to, with the 
panoply of manuals, documents, interpretive releases, etc. published 
by the NCAA, merely making those rules available is not a best 
practice when the rules themselves are presented in ways difficult to 
understand.104 Second, the document advises that “appropriate 
forms” must be made available.105 The measure of “appropriate” is 
left undefined, and the bureaucratic belief that forms can solve 
problems seems especially prominent here. 
Rather than evaluate the defects of each of the measures on this 
list, consider one illustrative example. The tenth and final item states 
that “[t]he institution and its staff members have a long history of 
 
 101.  Id. at 4. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Brain of the College Athlete, 8 DEPAUL J. OF 
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 154 (2012) (discussing how presentation of NCAA rules 
should be targeted to the way an audience is likely to process information). 
 105.  Principles of Institutional Control, supra note 94, at 4. 
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self-detecting, self-reporting and self-investigating all potential 
violations.”106 Evidently, the best way to demonstrate control over 
athletics is to have a history of having control over athletics. 
This Principles of Institutional Control document offers 
essentially no guidance on key oversight questions, such as proper 
reporting chains and lines of communication. It offers no clarity on 
when an institution’s compliance defects rise from a failure to 
monitor to the more serious level of demonstrating a lack of 
institutional control. 
C. Infractions “Case” Law 
The NCAA’s process for investigating and punishing rules 
violations has evolved by fits and starts, in large part due to public 
criticism of its handling of particular investigations.107 
Most investigations are launched after institutions self-report 
violations to the NCAA—only rarely do investigations begin due to a 
whistleblower tip or referral from a government agency. After the 
NCAA either receives a referral from an institution or has some other 
basis to believe a violation occurred, it will issue a letter of 
preliminary inquiry to the member institution.108 If initial exploration 
of an athletics scandal suggests a violation of the institutional control 
rule, the NCAA’s investigators will issue an official letter of 
inquiry.109 This letter will encourage the institution to conduct its 
own internal investigation.110 
At a prehearing conference, the NCAA staff members inform the 
institution of witnesses and evidence in the NCAA’s possession and 
consider any evidence the institution has developed through its 
internal investigation.111 
There are essentially no published infractions reports in which 
“no violation” is found. “The result of the Infractions Committee’s 
 
 106.  Id. at 6. 
 107.  Joshua J. Despain, Note, From off the Bench: The Potential Role of the U.S. 
Department of Education in Reforming Due Process in the NCAA, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1285, 
1306–10 (2015) (discussing reform of the NCAA’s compliance process in the wake of the 
UNLV/Tarkanian investigation and follow-on litigation). 
 108.  Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for a New 
Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487, 494 (1995). 
 109.  Id. at 495. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
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official investigation is always the finding of some violation of NCAA 
rules.”112 The critical question is whether the Infractions Committee 
finds a violation of the “control” rule or only of some set of less 
significant rules. 
Those decisions that are published provide the core of what 
might be deemed the infractions case law.113 In spite of the 
availability of prior cases and interpretations, however, the NCAA 
investigates each case de novo, and this creates a “glaring problem” 
regarding inconsistent rule interpretation.114 This is particularly the 
case with decisions on institutional control. Although it may be the 
most important rule violated by a college or university, institutional 
control is typically the last thing addressed in a public infractions 
report (PIR). No greater clarification is provided in the decisions of 
the NCAA’s Infractions Appeals Committee. Typical is one case 
reducing a finding of lack of institutional control to the lesser 
included offense of “failure to monitor,” in which the Infractions 
Appeals Committee offered only a “brief statement” and “little 
additional discussion.”115 
The remainder of this subsection explores five case studies 
involving identified or potential institutional control issues from 
the five years preceding the Penn State scandal in the summer of 
2012 (these cases cover the years 2007–2012). These case studies 
are offered in an attempt to gauge whether, in its case law, the 
NCAA has crafted clear direction on the meaning and import of 
institutional control. 
 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  This kind of terminology, as my co-author Marc Edelman has argued, may 
improperly and undeservedly confer on the NCAA a governmental imprimatur, when in fact it 
is little more than a private cartel. 
 114.  Connor J. Bush, Comment, The Legal Shift of the NCAA’s “Big 5” Member 
Conferences to Independent Athletic Associations: Combining NFL and Conference Governance 
Principles to Maintain the Unique Product of College Athletics, 16 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 5, 39 (2014). 
 115.  Glenn Wong et al., The NCAA’s Infractions Appeals Committee: Recent Case 
History, Analysis, and the Beginning of a New Chapter, 9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 
60 (2009). 
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1. Boise State University 
Boise State came under fire for practices regarding football, cross 
country, track and field, and tennis between 2005 and 2010.116 The 
rules violated concerned “impermissible lodging, transportation and 
practice sessions.”117 Additional problems involving impermissible 
financial aid awards, participation by ineligible athletes, cash 
payments, and unethical conduct were identified.118 
Prior to enrolling in the university, a number of football players 
bunked with enrolled student-athletes without paying rent.119 The 
housing was arranged by “assistant football coaches or football staff 
members” and allowed incoming student-athletes to participate in 
voluntary summer work-outs.120 The university’s compliance office 
requested certain information from incoming student athletes but 
did not monitor their summer living arrangements.121 Similarly, 
international student-athletes on the track and field, cross country, 
and tennis teams resided with current student athletes rent-free 
during a mandatory orientation session.122 The university believed 
this was permitted given that it was allowed under NCAA rules to 
pay for housing during orientation sessions, but according to the 
NCAA, paying for housing is not the same as arranging rent-free off-
campus housing.123 
In its report on athletic violations at Boise State University, the 
NCAA did not address institutional control until page fifty-four, and 
even then, the discussion is somewhat perfunctory. The report reads, 
“The scope and nature of the violations set forth in this report 
demonstrated that the institution lacked institutional control.”124 
Boise State’s failure to exercise control is supported primarily by 
the fact that its compliance regime failed to detect and avert 
 
 116.  NCAA COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT 1 (2011), https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/ 
miSearch?miSearchSubmit=publicReport&key=722&publicTerms=THIS%20PHRASE%20WI
LL%20NOT%20BE%20REPEATED [hereinafter BOISE STATE PIR]. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 4. 
 120.  Id. at 8. 
 121.  Id. at 9. 
 122.  Id. at 11–12. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 54. 
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violations of other NCAA rules regarding participation and 
recruiting. The NCAA states, “[F]ailures over an extended time 
period demonstrate that the system that the institution had in place 
was inadequate.”125 
The system’s inadequacy, to the NCAA, is proven by the fact that 
rules were broken. There was an “on-going ineffectiveness . . . to 
detect and deter potential violations.”126 This sort of language is 
repeated in a number of other published infractions reports.127 
2. Kean University 
Kean University is a Division III institution located in Union, 
New Jersey.128 The NCAA’s investigation focused primarily on three 
kinds of “extra benefits” provided to women’s basketball players and 
a broader problem in the university’s administration of financial aid 
to athletes.129 First, a special class was created to coincide with a 
basketball team trip to Spain.130 Since only athletes could take the 
class, it constituted a prohibited extra benefit available only to 
student-athletes.131 Second, the basketball team’s head coach 
provided cash to players during a Florida tournament, and—
unsurprisingly, given the obvious nature of this violation—did not 
report doing so to any higher university officials.132 Third, the coach 
intervened on behalf of a student whose grades had rendered her 
academically ineligible by contacting the university’s vice president 
for academic affairs, who altered an “F” grade to an “incomplete” so 
as to preserve the student’s eligibility for competition.133 
 
 125.  Id. at 56. 
 126.  Id. at 58. 
 127.  See, e.g., NCAA COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, KEAN UNIVERSITY PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2012), https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/ 
miSearch?miSearchSubmit=publicReport&key=809&publicTerms=THIS%20PHRASE%20WI
LL%20NOT%20BE%20REPEATED [hereinafter KEAN UNIVERSITY PIR]; NCAA 
COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, CALIFORNIA STATE POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, POMONA 
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT (2011), https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/ 
miSearch?miSearchSubmit=publicReport&key=725&publicTerms=(%20pomona). 
 128.  Quick Facts, KEAN ATHLETICS, http://www.keanathletics.com/information/ 
quick%20facts/index (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
 129.  KEAN UNIVERSITY PIR, supra note 1277, at 2. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 1. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 1–2. 
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In addition, for a four-year period, the university awarded financial 
aid to athletes more generously than it did to non-athletes and 
factored athletic performance into its financial aid considerations.134 
When the NCAA’s public infractions report turned to why these 
failures amounted to a lack of institutional control, however, the 
report becomes hazy. The failures were “consistent” and 
undermined “an atmosphere for rules compliance,” according to the 
NCAA.135 The cash payments did not raise institutional control 
concerns; however, the university’s financial aid practices, the Spain 
course, and the grade change demonstrated “lack of control over its 
athletics program.”136 
The general criticism of the special course in Spain offered by the 
NCAA is that the coach sponsoring the course failed to work 
through “appropriate athletics personnel.”137 
Among the findings in the PIR was that the institution’s vice 
president of academic affairs failed to consult with the athletic 
department before modifying a student-athlete’s grade: “[T]he 
former vice president for academic affairs sought no input from 
athletics personnel before he unilaterally changed student-athlete 1’s 
grade . . . . To take such an action without considering the possible 
NCAA rules ramifications constituted a lack of institutional 
control.”138 However, modifying a student grade seems squarely 
within a vice president for academic affairs’ scope of responsibility—
one could imagine the NCAA having problems with a decision to 
consult with athletics personnel under these circumstances because it 
might raise questions surrounding whether athletics influenced this 
inherently academic decision. That someone outside of the athletics 
department made a mistake concerning an athlete does not, on its 
face, reveal that the institution failed to control its athletics program. 
Moreover, although the university’s formal grade-change policy was 
not followed, the NCAA found no indication that the vice president 
who initiated the change was aware of the connection between the 
failing grade and the athlete’s continued eligibility.139 
 
 134.  Id. at 2. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 4. 
 138.  Id. at 17. 
 139.  Id. at 8–9. 
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With regard to financial aid, the university awarded non-athletic 
“Dorsey Scholarships” at a much higher rate to athletes than non-
athletes.140 By allowing the university to offer aid packages that 
didn’t count against athletics scholarships limits, the practice 
“bestowed a significant competitive advantage” upon the women’s 
basketball team.141 
The challenging aspect of the Kean PIR is that, other than in 
regard to financial aid policies, the rule violations primarily involved 
one bad actor—a basketball coach—who failed to bring to the 
attention of other university personnel her unusual and rule-violating 
behavior. The report contains no specific discussion of process 
failings either at the university or athletics department levels which 
allowed that conduct to go undetected. Even a robust compliance 
regime will miss wrongdoing by lower-level employees. Kean had a 
coach who refused to “work within the ‘chain of command,’”142 but 
the NCAA had no specific suggestion as to how to change the 
command structure to avoid this kind of problem in the future. 
3. The Ohio State University 
The Ohio State University (OSU) came under investigation after 
football players received free tattoos at a Columbus tattoo parlor in 
2008.143 Players traded memorabilia and autographs in exchange for 
“free ink.”144 Former head coach Jim Tressel “became aware of these 
violations and decided not to report the violations to institutional 
officials,” which was a matter of “great concern” to the NCAA.145 
Because the tattoo parlor owner was an outsider and not a 
“booster,” the freebies constituted “preferential treatment” of 
athletes rather than “extra benefits.”146 Over the course of the 
investigation it was discovered that OSU boosters had also arranged 
 
 140.  Id. at 13. 
 141.  Id. at 19. 
 142.  Id. at 11. 
 143.  NCAA COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2011), http://www.ncaa.com/content/ohio-state-public-reportv2 
[hereinafter OSU PIR]. 
 144.  Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Tattoo Regrets and Extra Benefits: Does Free Ink 
Justify an NCAA Suspension of OSU’s Terrelle Pryor?, J. NCAA COMPLIANCE, January-
February 2011. 
 145.  OSU PIR, supra note 143, at 1. 
 146.  Id. at 1. 
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“no-show” summer jobs for student athletes—that is, jobs in which 
the athletes were paid for work they had not performed.147 
No institutional control violation, however, was found. The 
NCAA lauded the institution’s educational efforts with student 
athletes regarding prohibitions on extra benefits and preferential 
treatment.148 While the institution did not detect the violations in 
question, on other occasions it had warned students about selling 
memorabilia to individuals who might contact them online.149 
The NCAA cited Ohio State for “failure to monitor” in 
connection with the no-show jobs.150 Although the university 
distanced itself from certain boosters, it failed to take “any 
monitoring actions” even after it became aware of the boosters’ 
efforts to extend unpermitted generosity to student-athletes.151 
However, the PIR contains no discussion of why these violations 
failed to rise to the level of a lack of institutional control. 
Distinguishing the OSU case from the Boise State case is difficult.152 
In both instances, a head coach had knowledge of rule violations, 
and violations occurred over a multi-year period. At a minimum, 
some discussion of why the NCAA felt institutional control was not 
the appropriate violation would have been illuminating. 
4. University of North Carolina 
The University of North Carolina (UNC) came under 
investigation after a tutor committed academic fraud involving 
football players, writing significant portions of papers handed in by 
the students for academic credit.153 That tutor, sports agents, and 
 
 147.  Id. at 10–11. 
 148.  Id. at 5. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 15–16. 
 151.  Id. at 16. 
 152.  Adam Bittner, Boise State Charged with “Lack of Institutional Control” Ohio State 
Totally Had, BLACK SHOE DIARIES (May 4, 2011, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.blackshoediaries.com/2011/5/4/2152871/boise-state-charged-with-lack-of-
institutional-control-ohio-state. 
 153.  NCAA COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 
CHAPEL HILL, PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 1 (2012), http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/ 
files/2012/03/UNC.pdf [hereinafter UNC PIR]. 
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“runners” also provided tens of thousands of dollars in benefits to 
student athletes.154 
The NCAA found that the tutor engaged in unethical conduct, 
rendering the athletes ineligible for competition.155 Impermissible 
benefits were provided by agents and “runners.”156 The institution 
itself was cited for failing to monitor in connection with agent 
involvement with one student athlete,157 but again, not for a failure 
to exercise institutional control regarding impermissible services 
provided by the tutor. 
Distinguishing the academic improprieties at issue in the UNC 
case from those at issue in Kean University is difficult. In both cases, 
the fraud did not come to the attention of athletics personnel in a 
timely fashion. The NCAA evidently decided that the UNC “scandal 
was not an athletic one,”158 but was forced to reopen its investigation 
several years later after a public outcry. 
Some observers attributed the NCAA’s decision not to charge 
UNC with a failure to exercise institutional control to the 
university’s decision to hold players out of competition during the 
pendency of the investigation.159 In other cases, the NCAA has 
identified a “proactive response” as a basis for reducing an 
institutional control violation to failure to monitor.160 While this kind 
of “cooperative” behavior certainly has a place in determining the 
severity of punishment, it does not provide clarity on the underlying 
standard of institutional control. What a university does during an 
NCAA investigation doesn’t explain how serious its failings were 
prior to information coming to light regarding potential violations. 
 
 154.  Id. at 2. 
 155.  Id. at 3. 
 156.  Id. at 8–9. 
 157.  Id. at 10. 
 158.  Sarah Ganim, NCAA Reopens ‘Paper Class’ Investigation at University of North 
Carolina, CNN (July 2, 2014, 2:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/30/us/university-
of-north-carolina-paper-class/index.html. 
 159.  Brett Friedlander, UNC Allegations Are Bad, but They Could Have Been Worse, 
ACC INSIDER (June 21, 2011), http://acc.blogs.starnewsonline.com/23165/unc-allegations-
are-bad-but-they-could-have-been-worse/. 
 160.  Wong et al., supra note 115, at 60. 
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5. The University of Southern California 
The University of Southern California (USC) was targeted after 
revelations emerged involving relationships between professional 
sports agents and former star football player Reggie Bush and former 
basketball player OJ Mayo.161 The NCAA’s Committee on 
Infractions was “troubled” by the “general campus environment,” 
which involved “relatively little effective monitoring” of locker 
rooms and sidelines.162 Violations included impermissible benefits 
provided to the athletes and their family members,163 including cash 
payments164 and travel expenses.165 
In finding a lack of institutional control, the NCAA noted 
deficiencies concerning institutional “monitoring of” student athlete 
“automobile registration” and employment at “the office of a sports 
marketing agent.”166 The institution “failed to heed clear warning 
signs” regarding elite athletes in high profile sports.167 Additionally, 
inadequate resources were dedicated to compliance.168 
One interesting piece of the committee’s decision is that it uses 
the phrase “monitoring” to describe a lack of control, when 
“monitoring” also has a meaning as the lesser offense of “failure to 
monitor.” The decision perhaps clouds the question of what 
“control” means by defining its absence using language echoing the 
necessary showing for the lesser violation. Given the obvious 
similarity between the terms “monitoring” and “control,” some 
greater clarification of the difference between these two levels of 
offense would be helpful. 
The USC PIR offers some of the most useful instructive 
language available in NCAA Infractions Committee reports 
regarding the obligations imposed by institutional control, but by its 
terms is somewhat limited to the “special” case of super-star, likely-
to-go-pro athletes. The committee opined that the “clandestine 
 
 161.  NCAA COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 1 (2010), http://i.usatoday.net/sports/college/2010-06-10-
usc-ncaa-report.pdf [hereinafter USC PIR]. 
 162.  Id. at 1. 
 163.  Id. at 14–15. 
 164.  Id. at 5. 
 165.  Id. at 16, 31. 
 166.  Id. at 46. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
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nature of intentional rules violations” requires institutions to put in 
place “well-conceived processes” to “assist in uncovering potential 
violations.”169 The failure to monitor automobile possession and use 
is noted, although that, of course, was also a problem in the Ohio 
State case,170 in which the university escaped a finding of a lack of 
institutional control. 
Once USC became aware that Reggie Bush was employed by a 
“sports marketing agency,” the school had a “heightened 
obligation” to monitor that relationship given the tremendous risks 
of NCAA violations that such a relationship presented.171 Various 
“red flags” should have triggered a more aggressive effort to 
monitor Bush and his relationships.172 
D. Conclusion 
Professor Potuto describes institutional control as follows: 
Among other things, institutional control requires the following: 
that universities comply with NCAA rules; that they monitor their 
programs to ensure rules compliance; that they are vigilant in 
detecting potential violations; that they investigate any potential 
violations promptly and thoroughly; that they self-impose 
punitive and corrective measures upon finding a violation; that 
they report information regarding potential violations to NCAA 
enforcement staff; and that they cooperate with NCAA staff in 
any infractions investigation.173 
It is in practice where things get complicated. Releases by the 
Infractions Committee, the “case law,” and the NCAA rules 
themselves leave important questions unanswered. Some of these 
questions are relatively simple, and they are ones that any university 
consciously seeking to design a compliance regime to avoid 
misconduct would want to have answered. Yet, because of the “roll 
over and play dead” approach universities take in the face of an 
 
 169.  Id. at 47. 
 170.  OSU PIR, supra note 143, at 3. The Ohio State PIR contains no information on 
whether the university had in place a system to monitor student athlete vehicle transactions 
or registrations. 
 171.  USC PIR, supra note 1611, at 47. 
 172.  Id. at 47–49. 
 173.  Josephine R. Potuto, Academic Misconduct, Athletics Academic Support Services, 
and the NCAA, 95 KY. L.J. 447, 452 (2006). 
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NCAA investigation and the lack of helpful dicta in the NCAA’s fact-
specific public releases, no guidance from the Association has been 
offered on these questions. 
For instance, it seems relatively obvious that an athletic 
program’s audits should be submitted directly to the university’s 
governing board,174 not to the institution’s president and certainly 
not to the athletic director. Yet even as late as 2004–2005, 80% of 
internal audits were directed to the athletic director, and a smaller 
share were directed to the university’s boards than was the case in 
1993.175 The lack of clarity regarding best practices has allowed this 
back-slide in compliance regime evolution to occur. 
III. DELAWARE FIDUCIARY DUTY ON CORPORATE OVERSIGHT 
Having considered the NCAA’s approach to control, this Part 
now turns to the Delaware fiduciary duty of corporate oversight, 
which the Freeh Report authors found helpful in defining the 
parameters of NCAA member institutions’ obligations to exert 
proper control. 
Corporate governance is typically and traditionally the province 
of state, rather than federal, law.176 However, one state matters more 
than any other for reasons that have been widely discussed in legal 
scholarship.177 That state is Delaware.178 Long the choice for 
incorporation of publicly held entities, Delaware is the forum in 
which shareholder fiduciary disputes are most vigorously litigated. 
This adversarialism has led Delaware courts to develop a nuanced 
body of law concerning the fiduciary duties of corporate directors, in 
which the duty of oversight has recently played a prominent role. 
 
 174.  Having the auditor submit her report to the athletic director or president “raises 
the question of the internal auditor’s reporting independence. To enhance the independence 
of the internal audit function, these reports need to be distributed to those individuals 
(Boards/Trustees) that have an oversight responsibility.” Michael D. Akers & Gregory Naples, 
Internal Audit, Sarbanes-Oxley and Athletic Departments: An Examination and 
Recommendations for Reform, 9 REV. OF BUS. INFO. SYS. 45, 51 (2005). A clear best practice 
in accounting is for the internal audit department to report directly to the board, id.; there is 
no similar clarity in the athletics context. 
 175.  Id. at 51. The authors refer to this as “[u]nfortunate[]” and “particularly 
alarming.” Id. 
 176.  Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2497 (2005). 
 177.  Wells M. Engledow, Handicapping the Corporate Law Race, 28 J. CORP. L. 143, 
146–47 (2002). 
 178.  Id. 
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A. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers 
The classic case on corporate oversight from Delaware involved 
the Allis-Chalmers Corporation,179 a manufacturer of electrical 
equipment.180 After having been found to have engaged in conduct 
prohibited by the federal antitrust laws, the company entered two 
consent decrees in 1937 with the federal government to avoid 
sanction.181 Years later, lower-level employees engaged in further 
price fixing and bid rigging.182 The company’s board, at the time, 
had not put in place any system to detect violations of antitrust 
law.183 The violations were not detected; renewed federal action, 
including indictments of managers, followed.184 
A shareholder suit was filed and subsequently rejected by the 
Delaware Supreme Court (the jurisdiction’s highest court). The 
court wrote that “absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon 
the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage 
to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect 
exists.”185 The court opined that the board simply could not be 
expected to “know personally all the company’s employees”186 and 
that the “very magnitude of the enterprise required them to confine 
their control to the broad policy decisions.”187 
B. Caremark 
Thirty-three years after Allis-Chalmers, another Delaware court 
faced the issue of whether the failure to exercise oversight would 
amount to an actionable breach of a board’s fiduciary duties. This 
time, the statutes violated by lower-level corporate employees were 
federal statutes prohibiting kickbacks in connection with 
government-funded healthcare programs.188 Employees of 
pharmaceutical company Caremark had paid kickbacks, and a 
 
 179.  Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 180.  Id. at 128. 
 181.  Id. at 129. 
 182.  Id. at 128. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 130. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Brown, supra note 46, at 16–18. 
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shareholder lawsuit sought damages for breach of fiduciary duty 
associated with “failing to adequately supervise” and take 
appropriate “corrective measures.”189 A proposed settlement—
involving relatively modest concessions by the defendant190—needed 
to be signed off on as fair by the Delaware courts. That, in turn, 
provided an opportunity to evaluate the underlying strength of the 
plaintiffs’ legal claims along with the appropriate legal standards for 
such suits. 
Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Chancery Court was bound by 
the “no espionage” precedent of Allis-Chalmers. However, he ended 
up crafting a duty that appears to most observers to have deviated 
from that guiding precedent.191 His “provocative”192 opinion asks, 
“[W]hat is the board’s responsibility with respect to the organization 
and monitoring of the enterprise to assure that the corporation 
functions within the law to achieve its purposes?”193 Board members, 
he answered, have an 
obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the 
corporation . . . assuring themselves that information and reporting 
systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to 
provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, 
accurate information sufficient to allow management and the 
board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments 
concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its 
business performance.194 
While straining to avoid explicitly disregarding the binding 
precedent of a higher court, he advised, 
[I]t is important that the board exercise a good faith judgment 
that the corporation’s information and reporting system is in 
concept and design adequate to assure the board that 
appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely 
manner as a matter of ordinary operations, so that it may satisfy 
its responsibility.195 
 
 189.  Id. at 18–19. 
 190.  In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 965–66 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 191.  Brown, supra note 46, at 14–16. 
 192.  Id. at 24. 
 193.  In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 968–69. 
 194.  Id. at 970. 
 195.  Id. 
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In addition, the individual 
director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to 
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which 
the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so 
under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a 
director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with 
applicable legal standards.196 
Prior to the Chancellor’s decision in Caremark, “Delaware 
courts expected little board involvement in the day-to-day work of 
the corporation, looking to the board only in the case of 
fundamental or self-dealing transactions.”197 Caremark represents a 
shift and “gave more substance to the duty to monitor.”198 Taking 
the decision to its “logical extension,” Caremark imposed upon 
boards the duty “both to establish and evaluate the adequacy of its 
internal control and information-reporting systems and to consider 
the legal and economic environment of the corporation.”199 
Even though it took a decade for the Delaware Supreme Court 
to validate the Caremark holding, savvy corporate lawyers responded 
promptly. They began to market a new array of services to help 
corporate boards detect and prevent organizational misconduct.200 
C. Caremark’s Progeny 
The Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Caremark holding in 
Stone v. Ritter.201 The case arose after AmSouth bank employees 
broke federal money laundering regulations for accounts used in a 
Ponzi scheme.202 The 2006 decision adopted Caremark as 
articulat[ing] the necessary conditions predicate for director 
oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement 
any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having 
implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to 
 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 726 
(2009/2010). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 
967 (2009). 
 201.   911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 202.  Id. at 365. 
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monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves 
from being informed of risks or problems requiring their 
attention. In either case, imposition of liability requires a 
showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging 
their fiduciary obligations.203 
Now endorsed by Delaware’s highest court, the Caremark 
decision has taken on “iconic status” and been cited “approvingly by 
courts in many other states.”204 Caremark represents perhaps the 
most important point in an “extensive judicial exploration” of the 
limits of statutory protection for directors of corporations.205 In 
subsequent cases, mostly finding that plaintiffs failed to state proper 
Caremark claims, the Delaware courts have identified the kinds of 
failings that could lead to a conclusion of lack of proper oversight.206 
This body of law culminated in the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
decision in the nearly decade-long Disney litigation,207 in which, in 
spite of alleged “ostrich-like”208 neglect, Disney’s board escaped 
liability for the company’s ill-fated decision to hire former talent 
agent Michael Ovitz as its chief operating officer.209 Although 
Disney’s board avoided liability, the case generated important 
published decisions in multiple decisions generated along its way up 
to, and back up to, the Delaware Supreme Court. 
D. Synthesis 
Delaware’s evolving law has had “tremendous influence over 
prevailing corporate governance practices.”210 Through their 
decisions, opinions, and commentaries, the state’s judges have 
helped “develop and define norms and best practices that affect 
director behavior.”211 
 
 203.  Id. at 370. 
 204.  Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 16 (2013). 
 205.  Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate 
Directors: The Disney Standard and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 216 (2006). 
 206.  See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 207.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Duggin & 
Goldman, supra note 205, at 216. 
 208.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 288 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 209.  In re Disney, 906 A.2d at 53–60. 
 210.  Pan, supra note 197, at 740. 
 211.  Id. 
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The fiduciary duty of corporate oversight developed by Delaware 
courts requires a board’s information and reporting system to be 
reasonable and tailored to the firm’s operational and regulatory 
context. The greater the risk of violations of applicable laws and 
regulations, the more onerous and intrusive an information and 
reporting system must be. The more a firm is on notice of red flags, 
the more its board should regularly review the quality of its 
information and reporting system. 
At its foundation, Caremark stands for a well-known 
proposition in corporate cases surrounding the fiduciary duty of 
care: board members need to ask questions.212 Even if they may not 
always come upon the right answer, board members have an 
obligation not to simply coast along assuming lower-level corporate 
employees, or even top executives, will behave in a manner 
consistent with sound business ethics and the protection of 
shareholder interests. Caremark is not really about the choices 
board members make. It is about what questions they, as a 
corporation’s officers and employees, have about the risks of legal 
violations associated with different corporate practices. Compliance 
is in large part about asking the right questions and generating 
compliance information and reporting systems that help frame a 
topic so that the board can ask the right questions.  
IV. PENN STATE SCANDAL 
 The previous Parts have described the NCAA’s institutional 
control rule and the compliance process through which the meaning 
of that rule has been developed and applied, and then described the 
Delaware fiduciary duty rules that evolved through shareholder 
derivative lawsuits. The two sets of oversight obligations come to a 
meeting point in the Penn State Sandusky child abuse scandal, when 
the Freeh Report authors turn to Delaware fiduciary law to interpret 
an obligation emanating from the NCAA institutional control rule. 
After reviewing the events of the Penn State scandal and detailing 
the substance of the Freeh Report, this discussion will turn to 
 
 212.  See E. Norman Veasey, Separate and Continuing Counsel for Independent Directors: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come as a General Practice, 59 BUS. LAW. 1413, 1417 (2004) 
(“Counsel should continually exhort the board to ask questions until the directors have a 
complete understanding of the matter to be decided and its ramifications.”). 
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contrasting the duty of corporate oversight with the concept of 
institutional control. 
A. The Basics of the Scandal 
The events of the scandal are, as noted previously, known to all. 
Timelines of how they unfolded are available.213 Jerry Sandusky 
played football at Penn State during the 1960s and joined the 
university’s football coaching staff in 1969. At one point, he was the 
heir apparent to coaching legend Joe Paterno. Sandusky engaged in 
multiple acts of child abuse beginning at least as early as 1994, both 
on and off the Penn State campus. Penn State officials knew of the 
allegations against Sandusky by 1998 but did not report them as 
required by federal law. 
B. The Freeh Report 
The Penn State Board of Trustees commissioned the firm of 
former FBI Director Louis Freeh to investigate the role of university 
employees in failing to report and respond to Sandusky’s abuse.214 
Freeh’s firm was specifically asked to make recommendations on 
changes to university governance.215 Investigators from the firm 
conducted 430 interviews and had access to “pertinent electronic 
data and documents.”216 
Though the facts motivating Penn State to launch an internal 
investigation were highly unusual, the tool of an internal 
investigation (conducted by outside counsel) has become a 
common one. The retention of outside counsel can help make the 
findings of an investigation “more credible,”217 and the utilization 
of a law firm to conduct such an investigation can shield some 
aspects of the investigation “from involuntary disclosure to third 
parties.”218 Moreover, law firms like Freeh’s “have developed an 
 
 213.  Bill Chappell, Penn State Abuse Scandal: A Guide and Timeline, NPR (NOV. 3, 
2015, 4:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/08/142111804/penn-state-abuse-scandal-
a-guide-and-timeline. 
 214.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 8. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. at 9. 
 217.  Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of 
Internal Investigations, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 367 (2011). 
 218.  Id. 
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expertise in the process of internal investigation itself and the 
resources to do so, to include skilled staff, and document 
organization and production software.”219 
1. Limitations 
In spite of its thoroughness, the Freeh Report is not without its 
limitations arising from the nature of the firm’s investigation.220 
Some of these limitations are as follows. 
 a. No subpoena power. First, because Freeh’s firm was retained 
by Penn State to conduct an external self-investigation, it did not 
have subpoena power in connection with the parties involved in 
the Sandusky affair.221 Individuals providing information to 
Freeh’s investigators were not testifying under oath; they might 
have lied intentionally, and there is nothing that could be done to 
them criminally.222 Of course, this criticism of the Freeh Report 
has strength only when the report is compared to judicial 
processes, since NCAA investigators and enforcement staff also 
lack subpoena power and “access to court-supervised discovery.”223 
This has, in the past, led NCAA investigators to be unable to 
obtain cooperation from individuals with knowledge relating to an 
athletics investigation.224 
 b. Evidence pursued without regard to admissibility. As an internal 
report, the Freeh Report was not drafted with the idea of developing 
evidence that could be introduced in a legal proceeding. As a result, 
considerations regarding the admissibility of evidence, such as the 
validity of uncorroborated hearsay or whether witnesses received 
appropriate Miranda warnings,225 did not play a role in the authors’ 
efforts to unpack the Sandusky affair. 
 c. Did not talk to key witnesses. Notably, Freeh’s investigators did 
not interview whistleblower Mike McQueary,226 Sandusky himself,227 
or other key parties involved in the affair, such as the university’s 
 
 219.  J. Justin Johnston, Corporate Investigations After the Mortgage Meltdown, 65 J. MO. 
B. 70, 73 (2009). 
 220.  A lengthy critique of the Freeh Report can be found in the form of a counter report 
commissioned by the Paterno family. KING & SPALDING, CRITIQUE OF THE FREEH REPORT: 
THE RUSH TO INJUSTICE REGARDING JOE PATERNO 6 (2013), http://espn.go.com/pdf/ 
2013/0210/espn_otl_FINAL%20KING&SPAULDING2.pdf. 
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head of public safety,228 who would have had responsibility for 
reporting criminal activity on campus under the federal Clery Act.229 
In most cases, the decision not to speak to a particular witness was 
made in response to a request of the Pennsylvania State Attorney 
General’s Office, which was responsible for pursuing criminal 
prosecutions in connection with the Sandusky affair.230 
 d. Protections against disclosure. The Freeh Report’s authors were 
employed by a law firm and their work would have been shielded by 
rules restricting forced disclosure to the extent it was connected with 
anticipated litigation.231 This means that interview notes and other 
“work product” might never be released and could not be compelled 
to be released in a legal proceeding.232 The university waived privilege 
to release the report itself, but much of the background information 
may forever remain outside of the public’s eye. 
 e. Profit Motive. Finally, some might wonder whether the Freeh 
Report should be viewed with suspicion since its authors were 
employed by Penn State. Perhaps the Freeh Report could not have 
 
 221.  Id. at 6–7. 
 222.  Michael McCann, Report Finds Paterno, PSU Leaders Concealed Sandusky Abuse, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 12, 2012), http://www.si.com/more-sports/2012/07/12/ 
freeh-report-penn-state-reaction. Penn State employees who lied to investigators might, 
however, have been subject to disciplinary action by the university. Though that might favor 
truth-telling, it would do so far less effectively than the threat of a perjury or obstruction of 
justice charge. 
 223.  Potuto, supra note 27, at 291. 
 224.  Greg Heller, Preparing for the Storm: The Representation of a University Accused of 
Violating NCAA Regulations, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 295, 310 (1996). 
 225.  Thomas R. Mulroy & Eric J. Muñoz, The Internal Corporate Investigation, 1 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 49, 81–82 (2002) (“Fact-finding is a primary goal of any 
investigation, therefore an employee with relevant information is important to that effort. 
Thus, any corporate-type Miranda warning given to an employee must not be overstated, such 
that the employee refuses to offer any information.”). 
 226.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 12. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. at 34–35, 37. 
 230.  Id. at 12. 
 231.  Mulroy, supra note 225, at 71–72. 
 232.  Id. at 72. In advising lawyers on how to conduct internal investigations, Mulroy 
and Muñoz advise that attorneys should “strive to include mental impressions, legal theories or 
potential strategies in all notes or memoranda of interviews with others, in order to afford 
those documents the extensive protection of opinion work product.” Id. at 83–84. 
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come down either too weak or too hard on Penn State or it would 
have lost credibility or dissuaded other schools and companies from 
hiring the firm for internal investigations in the future. 
 Because of simple profit motives, Freeh’s firm may thus have 
been destined to reach the kind of middle-ground conclusion about 
Penn State’s responsibility that it did—to find serious fault and 
problems but to decline to attribute them to fundamental choices 
about, say, the proper allocation of resources between the 
university’s academic and athletic enterprises. Saying there was no 
wrongdoing would not have gone far enough. Saying that Penn 
State should abolish its football program would have gone too far. 
Finding serious fault but blaming individuals more than systematic 
choices represents a middle-ground result. This kind of “middle 
ground” result of an independent investigation is not unique to the 
case of the Freeh Report.233 
Had the firm recommended, for instance, the elimination of 
Penn State’s football program, it would likely not have been hired by 
another university. Similarly, had the firm found no areas of concern, 
its report would not have deflected an NCAA infractions 
investigation, and again, the firm would not be hired for other 
similar projects in the future. 
2. Basic governance findings 
Limitations notwithstanding, the Freeh Report gives thorough 
treatment to the governance mechanisms that were in place at Penn 
State before Sandusky’s crimes became publicly known.  
The Freeh Report tells a story not just of crimes by Sandusky 
himself, but also failures on the part of “[f]our of the most powerful 
people at The Pennsylvania State University” who “failed to protect 
against a child sexual predator harming children for over a 
decade.”234 These four were: its president, Graham Spanier; its senior 
 
 233.  Consider, for instance, another former FBI Director’s report commissioned by the 
NFL to determine if the League had access to the graphic video of Ray Rice striking his then-
girlfriend in an Atlantic City Casino. That report identified failings by the NFL but found no 
evidence the video had been received. This “middle ground” not only gave the report 
credibility but also let the NFL off the hook on the most serious charges. See ROBERT S. 
MUELLER III, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE OF AN INDEPENDENT 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE RAY RICE INCIDENT (2015), http://robertmuellerreport.com/ 
muellerfinalreport.pdf. 
 234.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 14. 
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vice president, Gary Shultz; athletic director, Timothy Curley; and 
head football coach, Joe Paterno.235 “These individuals . . . 
empowered Sandusky to attract potential victims.”236 Motivated by a 
desire to “avoid the consequences of bad publicity,”237 these “most 
powerful leaders at the University . . . repeatedly concealed critical 
facts relating to Sandusky’s child abuse from the authorities, the 
University’s Board of Trustees, the Penn State community, and the 
public at large.”238 
Much of the report’s ire is directed toward Penn State’s former 
president.239 “Spanier failed in his duties as President,” the report 
concludes, “[b]y not promptly and fully advising the Board of 
Trustees.”240 But the failures went further—the university’s board 
“did not perform its oversight duties.”241 Both Penn State’s senior 
leaders and its board members had their own role to play, and each 
group failed to fulfill its role. The report also identifies other 
circumstances at Penn State that contributed to the governance 
problems of the school, such as a cultural reverence for the football 
program that fostered an attitude of entitlement, payments to 
departing staff members that were unjustifiably high, and a general 
hesitance to ask questions when foul play was perceived. 
 a. Senior leader duties. From the Freeh Reports findings and 
recommendations, one can identify four duties as among those 
applicable to an organization’s senior leaders: 
 (1) Report information about major risks to the board. 
Senior leaders—most notably a college’s president but also its other 
senior administrative employees—should bring major risks to the 
attention of the board. To do so, such leaders must both investigate 
and probe potential risks and develop and support effective 
compliance systems to detect potential risks. 
 (2) Encourage discussion and dissent and welcome a diversity 
of opinions. Penn State had a president who “discouraged discussion 
 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at 15. 
 237.  Id. at 16, 131. 
 238.  Id. at 16. 
 239.  Spanier may have been an easy scapegoat given that he had left office by the time 
the report was published. 
 240.  Id. at 15. 
 241.  Id. 
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and dissent.”242 Reinforcing the campus’s climate of hierarchy and 
dictatorship, there was very little turnover in the ranks of senior 
leaders at Penn State for a fifteen-year period. While stability offers 
some advantages, it also poses problems. Personal loyalty can come 
to dominate institutional obligations. Where the same tight-knit 
group that makes an initial decision to cover up or fail to report 
wrongdoing stays in place for too long, the desire or need to 
continue to keep secrets becomes even more intense. 
 (3) Share information. Penn State’s leaders operated under 
an “ingrained sense of secrecy” that was “hard to shed.”243 
(4) Ensure the organization has structured its compliance 
function to ensure success. Penn State is faulted for having 
created “no centralized office, officer or committee to oversee 
institutional compliance with laws, regulations, policies and 
procedures.”244 Instead, individual departments, including 
athletics, “monitored their own compliance issues with very 
limited resources.”245 Leaders should have identified the need for 
improved structures and made the creation of those structures a 
priority recommendation to the board. 
 b. Board duties. From the Freeh Report’s findings and 
recommendations, we can also identify the major responsibility of 
the board of directors of a university: 
(1) Demand and create systems to facilitate reporting of 
major risks. As to the board’s duties, they include, according to the 
Freeh Report, “oversee[ing] the President and senior University 
officials.”246 The board must put in place an information and 
reporting system to ensure that senior leaders provide the board with 
information allowing it to exercise its governance role. 
The role of a university board is “simple, at least in theory.”247 
The board is to be the “final authority for key policy decisions” and 
should “accept both financial and legal responsibility for the welfare 
 
 242.  Id. at 16. 
 243.  Robert Steinbuch, Four Easy Pieces to Balance Privacy and Accountability in Public 
Higher Education: A Response to Wrongdoing Ranging from Petty Corruption to the Sandusky 
and Penn State Tragedy, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 167 (2012). 
 244.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 31. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. at 15. 
 247.  DUDERSTADT, supra note 58, at 97. 
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of the institution.”248 In reality, however, the board’s ability to 
manage the details of athletics is limited: “[T]he level of 
understanding, experience, and accountability of most board 
members is rather limited and not well aligned with the needs of 
college sports.”249 
Penn State’s board failed to fulfill the Freeh Report’s vision of its 
duties “by not inquiring about important University matters and by 
not creating an environment where senior University officials felt 
accountable.”250 The board was identified by the Freeh Report “as 
one of the biggest culprits.”251 The President of the American 
Council of Trustees and Alumni observed: 
 This really should be a clarion call to trustees across the country 
to ask questions, to demand answers, to insist that the president is 
responsible to them, not the other way around . . . . For too long, 
the boards have been viewed more as boosters than as legal 
fiduciaries. And where athletics are involved, I think there is an 
urgent question whether some institutions have lost touch with 
their purpose.252 
To the extent the NCAA’s institutional control punishment of 
Penn State was due to the board’s failings, this may be the first time 
a governing board’s failures were the basis for an institutional 
control sanction. In part, the Freeh Report blames the board’s 
oversight failures for creating an environment in which top university 
executives failed in their roles: “Because the Board did not demand 
regular reporting of such risks, the President and senior University 
officials in this period did not bring major risks facing the University 
to the Board.”253 
In describing its vision of the duties of the Penn State board—
duties the board failed to fulfill—the Freeh Report cites two 
Delaware corporate law cases: Caremark and its confirmatory 
progeny, Stone v. Ritter. 254 The report provides: 
 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. at 106. 
 250.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 15. 
 251.  Brenda C. Liss, Lessons from Penn State and Rutgers, N.J. LAW., Dec. 2013, at 44. 
 252.  Richard Pérez-Peña, In Report, Failures Throughout Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (July 
12, 2012) (quoting Anne D. Neal), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/sports/ 
ncaafootball/in-freeh-report-on-sandusky-failures-throughout-penn-state.html. 
 253.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 97. 
 254.  Id. at 100 & 158 nn.563–64. 
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 A board can breach its duty when it “utterly fails to implement 
any reporting or information system or controls” or having 
implemented such system or controls “consciously fails to monitor 
or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.” The board 
breaches its duty not because a mistake occurs, but because the 
board fails to provide reasonable oversight in a “sustained or 
systematic” fashion.255 
Against this measure of its duty, Penn State’s board “fail[ed] . . . 
to exercise its oversight functions . . . by not having regular 
reporting procedures or committee structures in place to ensure 
disclosure to the Board of major risks to the University.”256 
The Freeh Report was not the first effort to draw a connection 
between corporate governance principles and regulation of 
intercollegiate athletics. For instance, Michael Akers and Gregory 
Naples, Marquette Business School professors, wrote a 2005 article 
suggesting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and emerging 
financial reporting concepts designed “for publicly traded 
companies[] could be used by not-for-profit institutions such as 
colleges and universities.”257 Two other authors constructed a 
fictional parable involving the NCAA adopting key mandates of the 
Dodd-Frank Act,258 including a requirement that the relationship 
between board members and university athletics programs be 
disclosed.259 Michigan’s former president explains that the NCAA 
institutional control rule “is a process, a system, and a set of values 
and expectations” that “is very similar to the system of audit controls 
governing a major corporation.”260 
 
 255.  Id. at 100 (quoting first Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. Ch. 2006); then 
quoting In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970–71 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
 256.  Id. at 16. 
 257.  Akers & Naples, supra note 174, at 45; see also id. at 52 (“[I]t might be more 
reasonably effective to take notice of some of the Sarbanes principles to demand that 
governing boards establish sufficient internal controls to more effectively manage 
intercollegiate athletics programs.”). 
 258.  David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, The NCAA Adopts “Dodd-Frank”: A Fable, STAN. 
CLOSER LOOK SERIES, Sept. 2011, http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-
pdf/cgri-closer-look-20-ncaa-adopts-dodd-frank.pdf. 
 259.  Id. at 1. Critics charge that “[u]niversity governing boards are all too often 
influenced by athletics boosters, sports media, or perhaps the personal interest and 
inappropriate involvement of some board members with intercollegiate athletics.” 
DUDERSTADT, supra note 58, at xi. 
 260.  DUDERSTADT, supra note 58, at 231. 
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The Freeh Report offers failure-damning criticism of the 
university’s board and the leaders who helped provide that board 
with information. To a large degree, the board’s failings are no 
different from the failings of boards of other organizations—both 
for-profit corporations and non-profits—that have failed to detect 
and deter significant scandals and criminal misconduct. 
 c. Institutional culture 
(1) Athletics vs. academics. The most damning dimension of 
the Freeh Report may very well be an indictment of big-time college 
athletics generally. The Freeh Report echoes complaints that have 
been offered by many individuals over the years regarding the role of 
athletics in American higher education—in particular, the place of 
football. One commentator stated that “[t]he culture of football in 
American universities is completely out of control.”261 
The benefits of a robust and competitive athletics program are 
clear. Evidence suggests that universities are able to attract donations 
(and to broaden their donor pool) through operating successful 
athletics programs,262 and universities obtain “great exposure” from 
the “publicity generated through television and media coverage” of 
college sports.263 Recent data exploitation suggests that success in 
football and basketball “significantly increases” student applications 
to a particular school.264 Student-athletes themselves benefit 
tremendously from intercollegiate participation, which provides an 
“important educational opportunity.”265 Athletics can also “act as a 
unifying force for the university community and beyond.”266 
 
 261.  Steven Salzberg, Get Football Out of Our Universities, FORBES, Feb. 15, 
2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/sciencebiz/2011/02/15/get-football-out-of-
our-universities/. 
 262.  See Jeffrey L. Stinson & Dennis R. Howard, Winning Does Matter: Patterns in 
Private Giving to Athletic and Academic Programs at NCAA Division I-AA and I-AAA 
Institutions, 11 SPORT MGMT. REV. 1, 17–18 (2008). 
 263.  Joel G. Maxcy, NCAA: Une Gouvernance Qui Maximise La Création De Valeur 
Économique [The NCAA and University Sports in America: Governance to Maximize Economic 
Value], 137 JURISPORT: THE REVUE JURIDIQUE ET ECONOMIQUE DU SPORT 42, 43 (2013) 
(Fr.), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405242. 
 264.  Devin G. Pope & Jaren C. Pope, The Impact of College Sports Success on the 
Quantity and Quality of Student Applications, 75 SO. ECON. J. 750, 750 (2009). 
 265.  DUDERSTADT, supra note 58, at ix. 
 266.  Id. 
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The question is not whether athletics has a place in higher 
education, or is of benefit to individual schools, but instead whether 
it is given its proper place. Critics continue to decry the prominence 
of athletics in educational institutions. Particular criticism is levied 
against the so-called “revenue sports” of men’s basketball and 
football: “They now threaten not only the academic welfare of their 
participants but the integrity and reputation of the very institutions 
that conduct them, our colleges and universities.”267 
 (2) Penn State’s failings. Penn State operated under “[a] 
culture of reverence for the football program that [was] ingrained 
at all levels of the campus community.”268 The Freeh Report called 
for the university “to undertake a thorough and honest review of 
its culture.”269 
Penn State, of course, is hardly unique in elevating the 
importance of athletics in its campus culture. The usual victims of 
sexual crimes “are not children but college students, usually 
young women.”270 As one advocate put it, the “culture of 
entitlement for athletes on teams” is “a culture that doesn’t only 
exist at Penn State.”271 
d.  Additional observations. In this section, I offer a few 
additional thoughts on what went wrong at Penn State in 
connection with the Sandusky scandal.  
(1) Fixation on soft landings and golden parachutes. In 
addition to the neglect of their duties of oversight and reporting and 
the culture of entitlement that pervaded their football program, 
Penn State’s leaders fixated on soft landings—providing golden 
parachutes to departing staff rather than making what might seem to 
be painful personnel decisions.272 Sandusky retired one year after the 
first report of an incident of child abuse on campus. While the Freeh 
 
 267.  Id. at x. 
 268.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 17. 
 269.  Id. at 18. 
 270.  Linda C. McClain, Against Agnosticism: Why the Liberal State Isn’t Just One 
(Authority) Among the Many, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1319, 1357 (2013). 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  It is hard to envision firing a child abuser to be painful, but it evidently was for 
Penn State’s leaders. 
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Report found no evidence that he retired because of the report,273 the 
timing is highly suggestive of a connection.  
 Let’s say, however, for the sake of argument, that Sandusky 
was retiring because he was told he would not succeed Paterno, and 
further suppose that that decision had nothing to do with reports of 
abuse. Even if these things were true, the circumstances of his 
retirement were highly unusual. He received an unheard-of 
$168,000 lump-sum payment to “make[] him whole” for reduced 
retirement benefits due to the timing of his retirement.274 
 (2) Leaders failed to ask “why” in the face of unusual 
decisions. Moreover, Sandusky was awarded an emeritus rank even 
though he did not meet the stated requirements.275 The provost 
approving that rank—Rodney Erickson, who took over as interim 
president after Spanier’s downfall—admitted unease with the 
decision to award the rank.276 “He told [a] staff member that he 
hoped that ‘not too many others take that careful notice’” of the 
decision.277 Yet Erickson—who emerged from the Penn State scandal 
relatively untarnished—failed to ask his boss, Spanier, why he was 
being asked to make such an unusual decision. Perhaps in private 
conversations Erickson did ask Spanier for an explanation, but there 
is nothing in the Freeh Report to make it clear that occurred. 
Even after he retired, Sandusky continued to be the beneficiary 
of Penn State largesse. In 2001, the Board of Trustees approved a 
favorable land deal involving Sandusky’s charity, Second Mile, selling 
a parcel of university-owned property to the charity for the same 
price the school had paid sometime prior.278 This unusual deal—with 
the university apparently not getting market value for the 
property279—along with the unusual terms of Sandusky’s retirement 
should have prompted questions, but they did not.(3) Two brutal 
facts of life for potential whistleblowers in small-town state 
universities. The question of why Sandusky was able to get away with 
his crimes, even as evidence presented itself to various athletics and 
university employees over the years, is one we may never be able to 
 
 273.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 22, at 59. 
 274.  Id. at 58–59. 
 275.  Id. at 60. 
 276.  Id. at 61. 
 277.  Id. at 61 (quoting Erickson). 
 278.  Id. at 79. 
 279.  See id. 
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answer.280 But the reality is that, given his power and prominence in 
the university’s cherished football program, Sandusky was a fearsome 
figure on whom to blow the whistle.281 Whistleblowers in all settings 
face severe disincentives when considering raising concerns outside 
the chain of command,282 including financial losses stemming from 
termination283, social ostracism,284 psychological suffering285, 
“blacklisting” in an industry,286 and even legal exposure.287 But for 
employees at a state university in a small town, the downsides of 
whistleblowing are particularly pronounced. 
In a setting like State College, Pennsylvania, there are simply no 
other viable employment options at similar salaries. To consider 
leaving the university if blowing the whistle should trigger 
retaliation, an employee would need to be willing to relocate to 
another geographic setting to have any chance of securing a 
comparable position. But since state employees are often the 
recipients of defined benefit pensions with “cliff” vesting,288 the 
consequences of termination prior to acquiring eligibility for 
retirement benefits are severe. As a result, it is not surprising that 
various Sandusky whistleblowers either remained silent or were not 
persistent in their efforts. 
C. NCAA Response and Aftermath: Legal Challenges Continue 
The NCAA acted promptly after the publication of the Freeh 
Report. It “coerced Penn State into accepting draconian institutional 
sanctions, including a $60 million fine, a four-year ban on any 
postseason football games, a significant reduction of football 
 
 280.  Notably, two janitors separately witnessed incidents of abuse in 2000 and did not 
report it out of fear that “they would be fired for disclosing what they saw.” Id. at 62. 
 281.  Timothy L. Epstein, NCAA May Use Bylaws to Manage Penn State and Syracuse 
Cases, 158 CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 3, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2276975. 
 282.  Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-
Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 118 (2007). 
 283.  Id. at 119–20. 
 284.  Id. at 120–22. 
 285.  Id. at 122–24. 
 286.  Id. at 124–25. 
 287.  Id. at 125–26. 
 288.  See Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 
1513 (2004). 
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scholarships over a four-year period, and vacation of 112 football 
wins from 1998–2011.”289 
Though the NCAA’s sanctions following the completion of the 
Freeh Report were intended to close the door on this messy 
scandal, they were hardly successful. A variety of legal disputes 
broke out in the months after Penn State accepted its punishment. 
For instance, Joe Paterno’s estate and family “filed a lawsuit in 
Pennsylvania state court against the NCAA . . . on May 30, 
2013.”290 But because “[n]one of the plaintiffs . . . [had] a direct 
contractual relationship with the NCAA,” they may have lacked 
standing to bring these claims.291 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania brought an antitrust claim 
against the NCAA, which was dismissed by the federal district 
court.292 Because the antitrust claims were “bootstrap[ped]”293 on 
contractual and process-oriented claims,294 they were doomed to 
failure. The lawsuit was widely perceived “to be a plainly political 
move for [Pennsylvania Governor Tom] Corbett,” under fire for his 
handling of the Sandusky investigation during his tenure as state 
attorney general.295  
Former Penn State President Spanier sued the university “to 
obtain his old e-mails,” which “were being used in the 
investigation.”296 Whistleblower Mike McQueary filed a defamation 
lawsuit against Penn State.297 Penn State sued its insurance company 
for denying coverage of other Sandusky-related lawsuits.298 The 
result, in short, was a “legal labyrinth.”299 
 
 289.  Mitten, supra note 9, at 322. 
 290.  Id. at 338. 
 291.  Id. at 339. 
 292.  Id. at 341 (citing Pennsylvania v. NCAA, 948 F. Supp. 2d 416 (M.D. Pa. 2013)). 
 293.  Id. at 340. 
 294.  The complaint essentially challenged the process leading to the Freeh Report, yet it 
attempted to frame its argument in the language of competition law. 
 295.  Sarah J. Kropp, Solving the Penn State Problem: Holding the Institution Accountable 
for Its Conspiracy of Silence, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 167, 192 (2014). 
 296.  Steinbuch, supra note 243, at 167. 
 297.  Lori Falce, Sandusky Case Leads to Legal Labyrinth, CTR. DAILY TIMES (Dec. 28, 
2014), http://www.centredaily.com/2014/12/28/4527715/sandusky-case-leads-to-legal-
labyrinth.html. 
 298.  Penn State Sues PMA Insurance over Alleged Breach of Contract, INS. J. (Mar. 6, 
2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2013/03/06/283862.htm. 
 299.  Falce, supra note 297. 
RAPP.AA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016 5:00 PM 
985 Institutional Control and Corporate Governance 
 1031 
V. CONTRASTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WITH 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL 
Penn State’s failings amounted to what the Freeh investigators 
analogized to a lack of proper monitoring and oversight of the 
organization’s operations. While the NCAA concluded that its 
requirement that universities exercise institutional control was 
violated, the precise contours of institutional control remain murky 
when compared to the relative clarity offered by Delaware’s law of 
fiduciary duties, upon which the Freeh investigators relied. 
A. The Contested Nature of Fiduciary Litigation 
Delaware’s fiduciary duty doctrine arises as the result of highly 
contested shareholder derivative lawsuits. In these cases, both sides 
are well represented300 and present persuasive and cogent arguments. 
Courts produce opinions which directly engage the arguments 
advanced by each side. For instance, in the Disney shareholder 
litigation, litigants battled for almost ten years and the courts 
produced five published decisions—three by the Delaware Chancery 
Court and two by the state’s Supreme Court.301 Over time, Delaware 
has developed “an extensive body of common law addressing 
fiduciary duties imposed on managers.”302 The fact that fiduciary 
duties are “often litigated” leads to the production of a “substantial 
body of case law that provides some reasonable degree of 
predictability, consistency, and clarity.”303 
Even when a court sides with a defendant—or finds, as 
Chancellor Allen did in Caremark,304 that there was insufficient 
evidence on record to find defendants had breached their duty—it 
may choose to articulate standards of liability that create new 
theories that plaintiffs can advance in future cases. The courts 
demonstrate “self-conscious attention to influencing the conduct of 
future transactions, independent of the case before the court,” and 
 
 300.  See, e.g., In re Lucent Technologies, Inc., Sec. Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d 426 
(D.N.J. 2004). 
 301.  Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 
458 (2007). 
 302.  Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited 
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2007). 
 303.  Id. at 28. 
 304.  In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968–72 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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thus “give[] special meaning to the phrase ‘mere dicta.’”305 Their 
decisions provide “guidance on how to conduct future transactions” 
even when such guidance is offered as a “lecture” (dicta) rather than 
by deciding the outcome of the case one way or the other.306 
More importantly, the evolving articulation of fiduciary duty 
standards in Delaware case law helps perform a “moral education” 
role, providing guidance and insight to corporate leaders regarding 
the scope of their obligations.307 The “ready-made vocabulary” 
flowing from judicial decisions provides the tools for rejuvenated 
“moral discourse.”308 The language used by the courts matters not 
just because it shapes “the advice that counsel provide to their 
clients”309 but because “what people say influences what they do.”310 
The courts’ rhetorical choices 
play an important role in constituting our moral and social 
worlds. . . . [T]he most distinguishing characteristic of fiduciary law 
is its operation as a system of moral education that promotes and 
reinforces trust and honesty in commercial transactions. The sermon-
like style of fiduciary rhetoric captivates our moral consciousness and 
contributes to an understanding of fiduciary obligation in ways that 
reason alone cannot. . . . [F]iduciary rhetoric seeks to intrude into 
the psyches of fiduciaries to create feelings of guilt for violation of 
duty and feelings of honor for upholding the tradition. This 
language encourages readers to internalize the message, to change 
their ways of thinking and being.311 
The language of fiduciary duty opinions creates a “legal lore that 
influences actors in a positive way.”312 It “speaks to our better side to 
desire noble aspirations, while simultaneously reprimanding our 
other side by instilling fear of fiduciary breach.”313 
 
 305.  Ronald J. Gilson, The Fine Art of Judging: William T. Allen, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
914, 917 (1997). 
 306.  Id. at 916. 
 307.  Duggin & Goldman, supra note 205, at 271–72 (quoting Marleen A. O’Connor, 
The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1318–19 (2003)). 
 308.  Lyman Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, 70 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 957, 965 (2002). 
 309.  Duggin & Goldman, supra note 205, at 271. 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  O’Connor, supra note 307, at 1318–19. 
 312.  Duggin & Goldman, supra note 205, at 271. 
 313.  O’Connor, supra note 307, at 1319. 
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The language of these opinions, crafting robust and moralistic 
fiduciary obligations, including obligations to engage in monitoring 
and oversight, would not have arisen absent the contested battles 
between plaintiff shareholders and defendant boards. Vigorous 
litigation produces published decisions (even when reviewing 
proposed settlements314) that offer greater clarity on rules and 
standards.315 Without plaintiffs and defendants willing to contest 
important aspects of the application of law to the facts of a case, as 
well as to contest the law itself, Delaware courts would not be able 
to “aggressively adopt and modify corporate law doctrine” and 
“exhibit[] a degree of activism that more closely resembles the 
legislative process.”316 “The nature of the litigation process provides 
courts with information” that allows “tailoring of the legal structure 
to the particular factual context presented.”317 Because the 
development of Delaware law is “litigant driven,” it allows parties to, 
in effect, “force the court” to evaluate the legality of a particular 
transaction or business practice.318 
Some have gone so far as to describe Delaware’s corporate law as 
a kind of narrative—the courts’ fiduciary jurisprudence is a “set of 
parables or folktales of good and bad managers and directors, tales 
that collectively describe their normative role.”319 Delaware judges 
“transmit[]” the “most important and dramatic tales” in a direct 
fashion, while other tales are “mediated by corporate lawyers who 
digest them.”320 Shareholder litigation thus offers far “greater 
 
 314.  Interestingly, in the usual scholarly account of the benefits of adversarial litigation, 
settlements are criticized for undermining the ability of courts to clarify the law by offering an 
interpretation of its application to the facts of a particular case. See Owen M. Fiss, Against 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984). In shareholder derivative litigation, settlements 
must be approved by a court. Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: 
Some Points of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
51, 68. This consideration typically requires the court to assess the strength of the underlying 
claims advanced by the plaintiffs. Courts must evaluate the “risks of establishing liability”—
how hard it will be for plaintiffs to win their case if a settlement is not reached—to determine 
whether the settlement falls within the range of reasonableness. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-
Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 814 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 315.  Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Rewiring the DNA of Securities Fraud Litigation: 
Amgen’s Missed Opportunity, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1475, 1491 (2013). 
 316.  Fisch, supra note 56, at 1080. 
 317.  Id. at 1084. 
 318.  Id. at 1089–90. 
 319.  Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1106 (1997). 
 320.  Id. 
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benefits than the current skepticism recognizes.”321 Despite a judge 
resolving only the case before her at a particular time and according 
to the facts it presents, Delaware opinions “yield reasonably 
determinate guidelines.”322 These judgments are communicated to 
business leaders by their corporate counsel, and thus “play an 
important role in the evolution of (nonlegal) norms of conduct.”323 
For instance, although the defendants prevailed and avoided 
liability in the Disney litigation, the various judicial decisions along 
the way directly stimulated corporations to “increasingly hire[] 
compensation experts” to review the hiring of senior leaders; post-
Disney, compensation consultants have “become an established part 
of corporate best practices.”324 What effectively amounted to dicta 
given the outcome of the case acquired tremendous “value” as a 
“written blueprint[] for board decision-making.”325 
A more discrete benefit of litigated fiduciary duty doctrine 
manifests not in published decisions but in discovery conducted in 
connection with suits that may, more often than not, end in 
negotiated settlement. The very “threat of discovery and the 
episodic legal demands for detailed corporate internal information 
have induced incremental improvements in corporate governance 
practices, including more exacting decision procedures, internal 
monitoring, recordkeeping, and securities disclosure.”326 Corporate 
“responses to the demands of litigation discovery contribute to the 
effectiveness of internal monitoring.”327 
Delaware’s fiduciary duty case law is also remarkably resilient 
and flexible, capable of evolving over time to adjust to new 
concerns and realities. Delaware’s fiduciary law, whose “genius . . . 
arises from its adaptability,”328 is “the quintessential application of 
 
 321.  Id. 
 322.  Id. at 1017. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 96 (2011). 
 325.  Id. 
 326.  Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate 
Governance: The Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corporate Law”, 63 EMORY L.J. 
1383, 1395 (2014). 
 327.  Id. at 1454. 
 328.  Duggin & Goldman, supra note 205, at 270 n.372. 
RAPP.AA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016 5:00 PM 
985 Institutional Control and Corporate Governance 
 1035 
the common law process.”329 As “business norms and mores change 
over time,” Delaware fiduciary concepts “acquire more defined 
content and doctrinal status over time as cases emerge addressing 
new business dynamics.”330 
B. The NCAA’s Lack of Adversarial Infractions Affects Decision-
Making 
The NCAA investigation process differs fundamentally from the 
adversarial character of civil litigation.331 With the possibility of severe 
sanctions, universities find themselves “facing down the barrel of a 
gun.”332 The last major program to receive the so-called “death 
penalty” sanction—a ban on competition in a sport for a season or 
more—was Southern Methodist University in the 1980s, and the 
severity of the sanction left the program (if not the university) in 
ruins.333 “[T]he mere threat of the ‘death penalty’ has yielded a 
chilling effect on member colleges’ independent decision-making.”334 
Schools can avoid the death penalty only through “vigorous 
cooperation,”335 not through vigorous defense. According to one 
attorney with experience in NCAA enforcement, “Most institutions 
bow down without a whimper.”336 
 
 329.  E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware 
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1413 (2005). 
 330.  Id. 
 331.  Marsh & Robbins, supra note 87, at 703. 
 332.  Alabama Girds for Battle with NCAA, 3 LEG. ISS. COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 1 
(Mar. 2002). 
 333.  Sean Sheridan, Bite the Hand That Feeds: Holding Athletics Boosters Accountable for 
Violations of NCAA Bylaws, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2013). The death penalty would 
also have a serious negative effect on “other members of the offending institution’s 
conference.” See DUDERSTADT, supra note 58, at 219. 
 334.  Marc Edelman, The NCAA’s “Death Penalty” Sanction—Reasonable Self-
Governance or an Illegal Group Boycott in Disguise?, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 385, 
419 (2014). 







 336.  DON YAEGER, UNDUE PROCESS: THE NCAA’S INJUSTICE FOR ALL 39 (1991). 
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The inability of schools to mount a vigorous defense when 
targeted is due not just to the severity of potential sanction but the 
uncertainty of the NCAA’s investigative and enforcement process. 
Schools feel “vulnerable” in the face of the NCAA’s “unfair and 
haphazard enforcement of the rules governing college athletics 
programs.”337 The NCAA’s process has been called simply 
“appalling”338 and its problems attributed to “structural deficiencies 
in the NCAA enforcement process.”339 “[I]nconsistency in results 
from one infractions case to another reduce[] the deterrent effect of 
penalties and the entire enforcement process.”340 Attorneys with 
experience in civil litigation find the entire NCAA process—with its 
emphasis on cooperation—to be foreign.341 As Michigan’s former 
president explains, “[N]either the language nor the enforcement of 
the rules [of the NCAA] . . . are subject to the long-established 
principles of jurisprudence that cover civil and criminal violations in 
our society.”342 
The Penn State case provides perhaps the clearest example of a 
university capitulating rather than adopting an adversarial position. 
William Devine asks, “What if the Penn State trustees had 
challenged the bylaws instead of acquiescing?”343 After all, “an 
acceptable legal argument” existed regarding the “irrelevance” of 
NCAA rules to the unusual circumstances of the Sandusky sex 
abuse scandal.344 “[S]omehow” the Penn State board members 
were persuaded to “submit to the Association’s authority,”345 even 
though, had they challenged the NCAA’s position, the saga may 
have played out differently. 
The nonadversarial approach taken by target universities 
permeates the entire NCAA compliance apparatus in higher 
 
 337.  Ray Yasser, A Comprehensive Blueprint for the Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 123, 156 (1993). 
 338.  Id. 
 339.  Davis & Hairston, supra note 21, at 984. 
 340.  Id. at 985. 
 341.  See Mike Rogers & Rory Ryan, Navigating the Bylaw Maze in NCAA Major-
Infractions Cases, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 749, 759–60 (2007); YAEGER, supra note 336, 
at 164–65. 
 342.  DUDERSTADT, supra note 58, at 220. 
 343.  William Devine, NCAA Magic Bylaws, INST. ECON. RENAISSANCE (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.iene.us/comment.magic.html. 
 344.  Id. 
 345.  Id. 
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education. Compliance personnel do not view an infractions 
investigation as an adversarial process, but instead as a “cooperative 
enterprise” governed by “NCAA rules initiatives and proceedings, 
which are in no way adversarial.”346 Attempts by an institution to 
“spin” the facts of an investigation in a way that minimizes the 
likelihood of sanction “are setting up the institution and the CEO 
for a fall.”347 
Institutions adopt a deferential approach because of the rewards 
for “cooperating” and the dangers of being found “uncooperative.” 
NCAA Rule 19.2.3 provides that “[a]ll representatives of member 
institutions have an affirmative obligation to cooperate fully with . . . 
the NCAA” and requires “full and complete disclosure of any 
relevant information.”348 The representatives also “have an 
affirmative obligation to report instances of noncompliance to the 
Association in a timely manner and assist in developing full 
information to determine whether a possible violation has occurred 
and the details thereof.”349 
When challenges are made, they tend to be on ancillary issues350 
(e.g., USC arguing about booster status rather than disputing the 
underlying allegations351). With regard to the core questions in an 
NCAA investigation, counsel is far more compliant. Consider, for 
instance, the way that Boise State’s outside attorney described that 
case in trying to argue that repeated violations associated with 
housing benefits for ineligible prospective students on a variety of 
teams did not amount to a lack of institutional control but were 
simply the “lesser” offense of failing to monitor: “You bring up an 
excellent point, and I don’t think the institution is shying away from 
saying this is absolutely without question not a lack of institutional 
 
 346.  Marsh & Robbins, supra note 87, at 703–04. 
 347.  Id. at 704. 
 348.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 40, at 312. 
 349.  Id. 
 350.  That representatives of target institutions do not adopt an adversarial approach in a 
setting in which they lack the basic tools of a typical defense attorney is not meant to criticize 
such representatives. For instance, institutional representatives have no right in Committee on 
Infractions hearings to cross examine hostile witnesses, which is one of the basic tools of 
mounting a successful defense in a civil or criminal proceeding. Brian L. Porto, Can the NCAA 
Enforcement Process Protect Children from Abuse in the Wake of the Sandusky Scandal?, 22 
WIDENER L.J. 555, 565–66 (2013). 
 351.  USC PIR, supra note 161, at 40. 
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control case. I think that is close.”352 This is from the “defense” 
lawyer, but it reflects a lack of willingness to directly engage the 
NCAA on the meaning and scope of its institutional control rule—
an entirely rational reluctance, of course, because of the danger of 
appearing recalcitrant and thus inviting more severe sanctions. 
The lack of a truly adversarial process is embedded in the 
NCAA’s rules and reinforced by the Association’s treatment in 
the courts. Courts apply a deferential law of voluntary 
associations approach to the NCAA,353 meaning that there is 
relatively little pressure on the NCAA arising from a fear of 
second-guessing. Three concerns motivate courts to avoid 
judicial review of NCAA decisions:  
(1) individuals should have the freedom to choose their 
associations and their rules; (2) judicial review of private 
associations would impinge on the right to freedom of association; 
and (3) rules and regulations of private associations are often 
unclear and are better evaluated by the association rather than by 
the courts.354  
Protected from subsequent scrutiny in the courts, the NCAA rarely 
goes beyond either finding a violation or not finding a violation. In 
addition, the NCAA rarely gives any account to alternative views on 
a particular scandal, and does not provide “dicta” to guide future 
decisions or publish dissenting opinions which would reveal diversity 
of position on whether particular misconduct violated the 
association’s rules. 
Coupled with this principle of judicial deference is the evident 
constitutional reality that the NCAA is not a “state actor,” which has 
an obligation to afford its targets due process of law.355 Private 
organizations are not subject to the due process provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment unless they are deemed state actors.356 While 
 
 352.  BOISE STATE PIR, supra note 116, at 59. 
 353.  Aaron Hernandez, All Quiet on the Digital Front: The NCAA’s Wide Discretion in 
Regulating Social Media, 15 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 53, 63 (2013). 
 354.  Stephen F. Ross et al., Judicial Review of NCAA Eligibility Decisions: Evaluation of 
the Restitution Rule and a Call for Arbitration, 40 J.C. & U.L. 79, 88 (2014) (calling for 
arbitration of NCAA eligibility decisions by an outside entity). 
 355.  NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191, 195–99 (1988). 
 356.  James Potter, Comment, The NCAA as State Actor: Tarkanian, Brentwood, and 
Due Process, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (2007). 
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there may be some ambiguity on whether today’s Supreme Court 
would continue to adhere to the Tarkanian notion357 that the NCAA 
is not a state actor in light of its decision in Brentwood Academy,358 
the fact is the Supreme Court has yet to consider a case offering an 
opportunity to revisit this holding.359 
Without an adversarial framework or the threat of litigation, the 
NCAA’s rules enforcement mechanism is also lacking in discovery,360 
which may be as important as published judicial decisions in 
enforcing internal self-governance for corporations. Targets in 
NCAA investigations lack the ability to force those with knowledge 
to provide information.361 We often never find out, in NCAA 
enforcement actions, who knew what, and when. 
NCAA compliance is also missing a sufficient number of 
published decisions identifying best practices that could avoid 
findings of a lack of institutional control in the future.362 The NCAA 
infractions process produces a list of “don’ts” but far less clear 
guideposts than Delaware fiduciary law as to the best courses of 
conduct for universities and their governing leaders. Without 
vigorously contested disputes producing published decisions that 
must be internally consistent and defensible, universities also lack the 
kind of moral terminology and ethical guidance that permeates 
fiduciary duty law. Universities lack the narrative and parable of 
Delaware law. Universities miss the “generation and promulgation of 
role-specific standards” that is “so critical,” with the vaguely defined 
idea of institutional control representing at best a “kindergarten 
 
 357.  Some have argued that “the facts leading to [the Tarkanian] holding can be 
sufficiently distinguished to warrant another review of the NCAA’s enforcement process 
requiring it to be held to the same constitutional scrutiny as the government.” Nolan 
McCready, Note, Former Student-Athletes’ Property and Due Process Rights: The NCAA as State 
Actor in the Wake of the Penn State Sanctions, 19 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 111, 113 (2013). 
 358.  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). In 
Brentwood, the Court found that a non-governmental association with membership consisting 
of many state entities but also private ones, could be a state actor as a result of entwinement. 
Under that theory, the NCAA might be deemed a state actor due to the involvement of public 
actors (state universities) in its governance. 
 359.  Kadence A. Otto & Kristal S. Stippich, Revisiting Tarkanian: The Entwinement and 
Interdependence of the NCAA and State Universities and Colleges 20 Years Later, 18 J. LEG. 
ASPECTS SPORT 243, 244–45 (2008). 
 360.  See C. Peter Goplerud III, NCAA Enforcement Process: A Call for Procedural 
Fairness, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 543, 551–52 (1991). 
 361.  Broyles, supra note 108, at 513. 
 362.  NCAA rulings are “untethered to any defined principle.” Miller, supra note 10. 
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norm[].”363 The stories are not told in a way that becomes “part of 
the definition and description of the roles” that various university 
and athletics leaders are expected to play.364 
Institutional control is principle-based regulation. But without 
an adversarial process at the enforcement stage, this principle lacks 
elucidation. The Caremark standard of corporate law is similarly 
principle-based, in that it avoids detailed prescriptions in favor of an 
ethical or moral approach to the fiduciary duty of care.365 To be 
effective, such an approach depends upon the existence of an 
“interpretive community that collectively develops, on a rolling basis, 
the detailed content of statutory principles.”366 Delaware’s judiciary 
and corporate counsel play that role through the adversarial structure 
associated with litigation and settlement of derivative claims. In the 
NCAA setting, there is no robust “interpretative community” to 
create detailed content. 
Ultimately, what the NCAA infractions process may be missing is 
not guidance on the little things, but instead on the big picture. 
Because of the lack of true adversarial engagement on the meaning 
of “institutional control,” NCAA rules tend to operate in a vacuum 
divorced from moral imperative. The broad fiduciary concepts 
crafted in Delaware cases and then applied to particular facts are 
missing from NCAA “jurisprudence.” Compliance officers, unlike 
lawyers counseling corporations, are simply not equipped to offer 
advice in robust terms about affirmative responsibilities367 to manage 
the well-being of the organizations their “clients” lead. 
The lack of clarity in the meaning of the norm-like standard of 
institutional control is especially surprising given that universities’ 
obligations to act according to that standard are a product of 
contract.368 Typically, courts would not “superimpose an overlay of 
common law fiduciary duties, or the judicial scrutiny associated with 
them, where the parties have not contracted for those governance 
 
 363.  Rock, supra note 319, at 1018–19 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 364.  Id. at 1019 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 365.  Chancellor Allen’s decision relied upon “moral suasion.” David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1855 n.177 (2001). 
 366.  Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial 
Regulation, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 441, 458 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 367.  Johnson, supra note 308, at 966. 
 368.  See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
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mechanisms in the documents forming their business entity.”369 What 
is amazing is that schools have not demanded greater clarity of 
contract in regard to the meaning of this powerful NCAA rule. 
C. Broader Implications 
The comparison of the NCAA’s approach to institutional 
control, ostensibly, according to the implication of the Freeh Report 
and the Penn State sanctions, consonant with corporate oversight 
duties under Delaware law, reveals critical failings associated with the 
NCAA’s approach to dispute resolution. Moreover, it offers broader 
lessons about the impact of different kinds of governance regimes 
and the best mechanisms for administering oversight and compliance 
systems to deter organizational misconduct. 
1. Deregulation and privatization of governance regimes can lead to a 
lack of clear-cut rules and standards 
The NCAA’s divergence from governance models widely tested 
and understood in the business world is empowered by the 
association’s lack of scrutiny in the courts, as well as the decisions it 
has made regarding how to handle disagreements among and 
between stakeholders. Unlike in the corporate setting, where 
shareholders are empowered to challenge fiduciary failings by 
corporate boards370 and boards are empowered to mount enthusiastic 
defenses, in the NCAA process the association deprives stakeholders 
of the opportunity to advocate vigorously for their own positions.371 
In the NCAA enforcement process, there is no nimble, neutral 
arbiter372 interested in the evolution of the standards governing 
 
 369.  Steele, supra note 30302, at 4. 
 370.  See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative 
Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 & 1344 (1993) (explaining 
that shareholder suits are “remarkable” and “afford a truly extraordinary form of relief”). 
 371. See Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes, and 
the NCAA: Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 WIS. L. 
REV. 545, 570 (discussing how stakeholders have little right to participate in NCAA 
regulatory decisions). 
 372. See Broyles, supra note 108, at 517 (“The biggest problem with the NCAA’s 
enforcement program is the lack of an independent decision-making body.”). 
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organizations that can perform the role played by the Delaware 
judiciary in business disputes.373 
One possible broader lesson that can be drawn has to do with 
the potential of private actors to construct governance regimes on 
their own. In response to a widening array of federal laws speaking 
to corporate governance issues, there has been a predictable call for a 
modified approach to regulating business and financial entities.374 
The notion that organizations can adopt “[s]elf-regulatory 
strategies” to achieve compliance has “taken hold in many areas of 
corporate regulation” and a “growing mass” of scholarly support.375 
Organizations can be trusted, it is argued, to manage themselves in 
ways that would redound to the benefit of shareholders. This “New 
Governance” school favors a move “toward problem-solving and 
away from either the punishment of perceived wrongs (corrective 
justice) and/or the enforcement of personal rights.”376 Entities 
would be given “a fair amount of discretion to devise processes 
necessary to achieve . . . broad goals.”377 
In fact, the NCAA’s failure to facilitate self-regulation in 
intercollegiate athletics compliance provides some evidence that 
organizational self-regulation is “ineffective at reducing 
organizational misconduct.”378 And as this article has demonstrated, 
the NCAA has nearly complete freedom to structure its own rule 
enforcement, yet it has failed to do so in a way that gives clear 
guidance to member organizations on their oversight responsibilities. 
2. Behavioral perspectives on wrongdoing and cover-ups 
 a. Clearly established standards on oversight responsibilities are the 
best way to address the prospect of organizational misconduct. In spite 
 
 373.  See generally Baer, supra note 200, at 974–75 (discussing how the lack of a 
“neutral, third-party arbiter that mediates the competing claims of two adversaries and their 
counsel” can cause “accountability problems” in the “regulation and implementation” of 
compliance regimes). 
 374.  See John W. Cioffi, State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative 
Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research, 48 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 501, 510 (2000). 
 375.  Timothy P. Glynn, Taking Self-Regulation Seriously: High-Ranking Officer 
Sanctions for Work-Law Violations, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 279, 310 (2011). 
 376.  Baer, supra note 200, at 1001. 
 377.  Id. at 1002. 
 378.  Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent 
Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 596 (2005). 
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of perceived similarity between the NCAA’s contractual imposition 
of an institutional control obligation on member schools and the 
Delaware fiduciary obligation on the part of corporate boards to 
exercise meaningful oversight, there are of course differences 
between the goals of NCAA compliance and corporate governance. 
The NCAA demands adherence to the principle of institutional 
control for instrumental reasons—to ensure that its other rules are 
respected. By comparison, fiduciary duties exist to protect 
shareholders from the agency costs arising from the separation of 
ownership and control.379 Institutional control operates to deter rule 
violations, in particular when they provide a competitive advantage 
to a violating school, to help maintain a “level playing field” in 
intercollegiate athletics. The obligation to exercise oversight in the 
corporate setting operates to deter lower-level corporate actors from 
committing abuses that redound to the disadvantage of shareholders. 
Yet there is a common target, as well. Both institutional control 
and corporate oversight seek to minimize the incidence and effects 
of misconduct within an organization. The NCAA’s approach does 
a far less meaningful job than the corporate law’s in creating clear 
and flexible standards that can enhance an organization’s 
compliance activities.380 
b. Optimism-commitment whipsaw. Another similarity between 
the Sandusky scandal and corporate oversight failings in the 
corporate world may be found in the behavioral factors that lead to 
compliance breakdowns. Professor Donald Langevoort coined the 
term “optimism-commitment whipsaw” to answer the question, 
“[W]hy would public companies ever deliberately lie to investors?”381 
He asserts that business fraud arises because managers become 
committed to an overly optimistic narrative after passing the point at 
 
 379.  ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 66 (McMillan Company rev. ed. 1933). 
 380.  See generally Michael Faure et al., The Regulator’s Dilemma: Caught Between the 
Need for Flexibility & the Demands of Foreseeability. Reassessing the Lex Certa Principle, 24 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 283, 364 (2014) (“[L]egal certainty plays an important role in 
ensuring efficient regulation by enabling and incentivizing individuals to modify their behavior 
in compliance with the legal norm.”). 
 381.  Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 101, 106 (1997). 
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which project failure threatens careers, even though that point 
precedes the true realization of dangers associated with a product.382 
Langevoort’s explanation begins in the initial period in 
which a decision is made to launch a project—something that 
occurs in an atmosphere of extreme ambiguity.383 Natural 
optimism leads to presentations to senior officials that are overly 
optimistic about the potential upside of a project and which 
downplay the project’s risks.384 
Once the project is underway, those closest to it, with the best 
access to information, try to preserve an aura of optimism to prevent 
the project from being cancelled.385 “[R]isks are not reported at all, 
or they are communicated upward in a way that dulls [the message 
being transmitted].”386 As more serious danger signs emerge, the 
project’s managers become even more committed—at this point they 
are both emotionally and economically wedded to a project and its 
failure would threaten negative implications for their careers.387 “At 
that point, an active cover-up might begin.”388 Professor Langevoort 
explains, “The important point . . . is that the final awareness of the 
risk or harm occurs . . . after the point in time at which . . . the 
responsible actors are likely to be held accountable.”389 Now 
committed to a rosy version, even if that does not match reality, 
business leaders lie. 
The whipsaw provides an explanation of what happened at 
Penn State after initial indications suggested Sandusky had engaged 
in criminal activity. Overoptimism about Sandusky involved 
administrators who heard initial reports that he had been 
showering with children in the Penn State locker room as 
indicating that he was just weird, not an abuser.390 Furthermore, 
administrators may have been optimistic about their own ability to 
 
 382.  Id. at 146–47. 
 383.  Id. at 147. 
 384.  Id. 
 385.  Id. at 166. 
 386.  Id. 
 387.  Id. at 167. 
 388.  Id. 
 389.  Id. 
 390.  “Pillars of the community are given much more of a benefit of the doubt.” See 
Patrick Hruby, Could the Penn State Abuse Scandal Happen Somewhere Else? Definitely, 
ATLANTIC (July 16, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/07/ 
could-the-penn-state-abuse-scandal-happen-somewhere-else-definitely/259907/. 
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keep these allegations secret. As time passed, and as it became clear 
that the optimistic view of Sandusky was wrong—that is, it became 
clear that he was an abuser—Penn State had reached the point 
where the senior leadership of the university would now suffer 
personal career harm if Sandusky’s conduct was to be made public. 
Their optimism proven off base, they were now committed to 
keeping the information confidential. 
 c. Effective information systems and the whipsaw. There is no 
simple solution to the optimism-commitment whipsaw, since it 
represents organizational failures that are rooted in basic human 
nature.391 But information and reporting systems like those called for 
by Delaware’s fiduciary law represent the best hope. Implementing 
an “adequate reporting system[]” makes it easier for directors to spot 
fraud at the early stages. Compliance systems bring information to 
the board rather than forcing the board to seek it out. Without 
compliance systems, the burden falls “on individual directors to 
inquire proactively,” whereas with compliance systems, “better 
information flows about both the company’s ongoing operations and 
new projects.” Both the business’s bottom line and fraud-avoidance 
are served by the free flow of information becoming “an 
institutionalized part of corporate decisionmaking.”392 Information 
and reporting systems can also help “slow” the thinking of 
organizational leaders, allowing them to overcome biases and make 
better decisions.393 At a minimum, an information system forces 
decision-makers to slow down long enough to acknowledge the 
presence of new information. 
By adding clarity in regards to the board’s oversight 
obligations, Delaware courts have helped to foster an atmosphere 
that mitigates the whipsaw in practice.394 A “highly indeterminate” 
standard is likely to have a less “direct impact on firm behavior than 
we would like to think.”395 The NCAA’s institutional control 
 
 391.  Glynn, supra note 375, at 314 (noting “how difficult it is for firms to design and 
maintain genuinely effective compliance systems”). 
 392.  Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate 
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 752–53 (2005). 
 393.  Ann Morales Olazabal, Behavioral Science and Scienter in Class Action Securities 
Fraud Litigation, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1423, 1445 (2013). 
 394.  Paredes, supra note 392, at 754. 
 395.  Langevoort, supra note 382, at 169 (italics omitted). 
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standard, without the elaboration provided by dicta or dissent, is 
one such indeterminate standard. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Freeh Report’s inclusion of corporate law principles in an 
analysis of higher education athletics administration provides an 
interesting opportunity to compare the respective systems of 
corporate oversight and college sports compliance. In that 
comparison, the NCAA’s approach leads to less clarity in regard to 
the meanings of the obligations the association imposes upon its 
members. It is no surprise that no one knew if Penn State would 
even be the target of an NCAA investigation in connection with 
the Sandusky scandal, given the lack of clarity in regard to the 
NCAA’s rules. 
Fortunately, it is possible to view the Penn State scandal as a 
“one off,” the kind of thing one may never have to see again—a 
perfect storm396 of a powerful football program and a deviant 
criminal sheltered in its midst arose in State College, Pennsylvania. 
But while the precise circumstances of the scandal may never arise 
again,397 the broader problems the Penn State story reveals for 
America’s universities cannot be ignored.398 While the NCAA’s 
requirement of institutional control appears at face value to impose 
oversight responsibilities on university leaders, the process by which 
the NCAA investigates and adjudicates rule violations leaves much to 
be desired. 
The key standards in the NCAA’s rules at issue in the Penn State 
scandal—institutional control, as well as ethical conduct—are ones 
about which colleges and universities need greater clarity. An obvious 
first step would be for the NCAA, on its own, to modify its approach 
to rendering infractions decisions and offer more meaningful dicta 
and guidance. Where there is a finding of a failure to monitor but 
not a failure to exercise institutional control, the NCAA Committee 
 
 396.  Stephanie A. Shields, The Perfect Storm: Power, Privilege, and Silence, AM. 
PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.apadivisions.org/division-35/news-events/ 
news/2011/perfect-storm.aspx. 
 397.  But see Frederick E. Allen, Why the Penn State Scandal Happened—and How to Keep 
Other Scandals from Happening, FORBES (July 20, 2012, 11:07 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/frederickallen/2012/07/20/why-the-penn-state-scandal-
happened-and-how-to-keep-scandals-from-happening/. 
 398.  Id. 
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on Infractions should issue an explanation of why not. Explaining 
why, for instance, Ohio State’s “tattoo-gate” scandal was not a 
violation of the institutional control rule would have helped other 
universities calibrate their own compliance and detection regimes. 
Relatedly, the NCAA could permit dissenting Infractions Committee 
members to file separate opinions that identified points on which 
they disagree—under current practices, NCAA written opinions 
“never reflect . . . differences” in view by committee members.399 
The current NCAA enforcement process simply “fails in recognizing 
and valuing the importance of dissenting opinions.”400 Although 
dissenting opinions may not affect the outcome of a particular case, 
their value arises from giving the public increased confidence in the 
organization’s decision-making and facilitating reform should 
membership agree with a dissenting rather than dominant view.401 
More aggressive reform could involve organizational changes 
rather than unilateral action. For instance, the actual decision-
making process could be divorced from the NCAA itself and handed 
to a neutral party such as an arbitrator402 or an independent 
tribunal.403 The NCAA would no longer be both prosecutor and 
adjudicator, and some other entity would be created to determine 
when rules were violated.404 Targeted universities would thus be free 
to mount more vigorous defenses and the decision-maker would 
produce careful, nuanced decisions that offered clarity schools could 
use to improve their internal oversight and compliance regimes. 
While this option has been considered by the NCAA in the past, it 
has not been embraced.405 
Improvements in how information is marshaled regarding 
potential rule violations are also warranted. States could permit the 
NCAA or targeted institutions to “request subpoena power on a 
 
 399.  Gene A. Marsh, A Call for Dissent and Further Independence in the NCAA 
Infractions Process, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 695, 711 (2009). 
 400.  Id. at 713. 
 401.  Id. at 715–16. 
 402.  Ross et al., supra note 354, at 79 (calling for arbitration of NCAA eligibility 
decisions by an outside entity). 
 403.  Broyles, supra note 108, at 565. 
 404.  One author called for a “voluntary transfer of enforcement responsibilities to an 
outside organization.” See Miller, supra note 10. 
 405.  Robin J. Green, Does the NCAA Play Fair? A Due Process Analysis of NCAA 
Enforcement Regulations, 42 DUKE L.J. 99, 133 (1992). 
RAPP.AA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016 5:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1048 
case-by-case basis.”406 The lack of subpoena power makes the 
NCAA’s enforcement program less effective than “compliance 
programs run by administrative agencies.”407 In reality, the NCAA 
may be reluctant to request subpoena power out of a fear it would 
trigger additional legislative oversight of the association.408 
At the end of the day, something needs to be done to free 
colleges and universities to defend themselves without fear of the 
massive financial repercussions of the “death penalty.” In corporate 
litigation, that role may be served by director and officer (“D & O”) 
insurance, which would be responsible for any financial losses409 and 
may pay for and direct the defense of corporate directors targeted in 
a shareholder derivative suit.410 The directors targeted in a fiduciary 
lawsuit are not playing with their own money and not, in many cases, 
even directing their own defense.411 The insurer—with an 
institutional incentive to achieve clarity in legal standards even if it 
means risking loss in a particular case412—plays that role. Perhaps 
some parallel could be developed for NCAA compliance 
investigations—with schools paying insurers who would then cover a 
financial penalty lodged against a school based on violations. This 
would of course require a complete rethinking of NCAA sanctions, 
which currently target the institutions themselves and are primarily 
visited not on the wrongdoers, but on those who remain affiliated 
with a university after postseason competition bans and scholarship 
reductions are imposed. 
Other authors have proposed replacing the NCAA’s current 
regime of sanctions with larger fines against violating institutions.413 
 
 406.  Broyles, supra note 108, at 565. 
 407.  Marsh, supra note 399, at 697. 
 408.  Josephine R. Potuto, NCAA as State Actor Controversy: Much Ado About Nothing, 
23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 37 (2012). 
 409.  “Liability insurers bankroll shareholder litigation in the United States.” See Tom 
Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ 
and Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 487 (2007). 
 410.  Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, D & O Insurance: A Primer, 1 
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337, 351 (2012). 
 411.  Even without an insurance policy providing a defense, the company itself will often 
provide that defense for its directors. 
 412.  The insurer is an “obvious example” of a “repeat player.” HERBERT M. KRITZER, 
THE JUSTICE BROKER 71 (1990). 
 413.  Christopher Davis, Jr. & Dylan Oliver Malagrino, Hold Your Fire: The Injustice of 
NCAA Sanctions on Innocent Student Athletes, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 432, 457 (2012). 
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Increased fines “would punish the institution for infractions while 
limiting the impact on current student-athletes because the 
punishment is directed towards the institution and its administration 
rather than at the specific athletics programs in which the current 
student athletes are involved.”414 Large fines could deter future 
violations “because university administrators would push the athletics 
department to comply with the NCAA rules, and in turn the 
athletics department would push the coaches to comply with the 
NCAA rules.”415 A move from scholarship reductions and post-
season bans to larger fines would also create a potential market for 
“infractions insurance,” in which institutions could contract for 
insurance policies calibrated to their own particular level of risk.416 It 
would also allow an insurer to play the role of zealous defense, 
helping to create a more robust adversarial “jurisprudence” in 
compliance that would provide far greater clarity on the meaning of 
key NCAA standards like institutional control. 
Corporate America has been driven by changes in both federal 
and state law to adopt meaningful compliance regimes to ensure 
effective oversight of operations across a range of industry. 
Delaware’s adversary litigation-generated fiduciary jurisprudence has 
played an important role in driving that change. In intercollegiate 
athletics, schools know that violations of the NCAA’s rules are 
serious but haven’t been given the tools to develop effective 
compliance regimes. The NCAA bears much of the blame. 
  
 
 414.  Id. 
 415.  Id. 
 416.  For instance, institutions like USC with “unique” athletes likely to face temptations 
could obtain more robust insurance coverage. 
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